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Abstract 
 
 
This study reveals the two dimensions of religious freedom – religious groups and 
individuals – with empirical data, and it offers theoretical arguments on how these two 
dimensions are different. Individual rights provision is less threatening to dominant societal 
factions and the state, but abusing these rights is also less visible; group rights provision is more 
threatening to dominant societal factions and the state, but abusing these rights is also more 
visible. International forces – international law, human rights organizations, and globalization - 
influence the protection of the two dimensions of religious freedom differently. Globalization as 
a general force is fueling nationalist backlash and challenging states’ authority, causing 
governments to impose new restrains on religious rights – particularly those at the group-level.  
However, the ratification of ICCPR leads to a better protection of religious rights for groups but 
not for individuals, because restrictions of groups are in the public and easier to be observed, 
thus imposing a bigger reputational cost on states under the international legal commitment. 
Similarly, the domestic presence of International Human Rights Organizations (HROs) improves 
rights protection for religious groups but not for individuals, because HROs are able to reduce 
the political repercussions religious groups face from social movement activism. Nevertheless, 
there is also a solution to the restrictions on religious individuals; naming and shaming 
campaigns provide new information to the international audience and expose the covert 
regulations on religious individuals, therefore, they increase reputational costs for rights 
violating states. 
                                                                                   1 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
    My dissertation aims to answer this question: what explains the cross-national variation 
in governments’ respect for religious rights? The atrocities of the Holocaust triggered a global 
movement to establish a universal code of conduct providing for the dignity and equality of all 
people. The result was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and a series of 
international treaties based on its principles. These documents serve as the foundation of the 
international human rights regime, and they commit states to protect a wide variety of civil, 
political, economic, and cultural rights.  
There is now a significant body of research measuring and analyzing the degree to which 
states adhere to these international human rights norms in practice. However, a disproportionate 
portion of this work has focused on physical integrity rights specifically. While there is no doubt 
that physical integrity rights are important, this myopia in the scientific study of human rights 
means that we know considerably less about when, where, and why governments respect or 
abuse other rights that play an equally important role in ensuring human dignity.  
This study focuses on religious rights. Human rights should not only be about physical 
integrity, but also spiritual integrity – the free practice of religious beliefs individually and 
collectively. Major UN human rights instruments such as UDHR, 1981 Declaration, and ICCPR 
all have recognized religious freedom as a human right. However, religious restrictions and 
discrimination have been increasing in the past decade (Pew Research Center Report 2018). 
Organized religions often arouse states’ suspicion and pose a potential threat to the autocratic 
rulers, therefore, autocracies tend to have a higher level of religious restrictions (Sarkissian 
2015).  Religious discrimination is also widespread and exist not only in autocracies but also in 
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democracies. Religious minorities often become the targets of nationalist movements. Despite 
these trends, religious rights are marginalized in the scientific study of human rights. Scholars 
have not incorporated religious freedom in the framework of human rights study to examine why 
states restrict religions and how to better realize religious freedom.  
Another oversight in the existing literature is the dual nature of human rights. Human 
beings do not only live as individuals, but also co-exist in a social setting. Human rights are both 
individual and collective. The expression of various human rights often contains a collective 
dimension, which is often neglected by scholars. Humans should be treated with dignity and 
respect both as individuals and in community. In this project, I will account for this dual nature 
of human rights by explicitly theorizing and examining both individual and collective 
dimensions of spiritual integrity rights provision.  
As spiritual integrity rights have often been neglected in the scientific study of human 
rights, there are many potential angles from which to examine this question. In this dissertation, I 
look at the issue from an international angle, and evaluate the role that global forces play in 
shaping governments’ respect of religious freedoms. Specifically, I isolate international law, 
transnational human rights activism, and globalization as the independent variables of chief 
theoretical interest. There are thus six empirical questions that are addressed in this study:  
a. Does international law – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- influence 
states’ practice in the protection of religious rights? How might these influences be 
different for organizations and individuals? 
b. Do international human rights organizations influence states’ practice in the protection of 
religious rights? How might these influences be different for organizations and 
individuals? 
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c. Do globalization and its three dimensions (political, economic and cultural globalization) 
influence states' practice in religious freedom? How might these influences be different 
for individuals and organizations? 
I study these questions through the application of theories and methods drawn from 
international relations, religion and politics, and comparative politics. I see three significant 
contributions from this project. First, it expands human rights studies to include religious rights, 
thus enriching the study of human rights in theory building and empirical findings. Second, it 
builds a framework to bridge the literatures on international human rights and religion and 
politics, thus examining human rights in a more comprehensive picture. Third, this study reveals 
the dual nature of human rights and discovers that states have different motivation and incentives 
in treating individuals and organizations in term of human rights.  
Over the following pages, I will make a case for the theoretical distinction between 
individual and collective religious freedoms, which will serve as the dependent variables in the 
three empirical studies comprising this dissertation. I will then discuss my focus on the role 
played by global forces and summarize the findings in the three corresponding empirical 
chapters.  
1.1 The Dual Nature of Spiritual Integrity Rights  
UHDR Article 18 recognizes both dimensions of religious rights – “everyone has the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,….alone or in community with others and in 
public or private…” – and the same principle is reiterated in ICCPR. Religious freedom is not 
only personal but also social. It is a personal right, because religion is a core element of an 
individual’s belief system and often defines individual identities. This individual dimension of 
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religious freedom is related to the expressive needs of religious individuals, such as praying, 
worshipping in churches, etc. Religious freedom also has a social dimension, which 
acknowledges individuals’ group identities and connections to faith communities. The social 
dimension of religious rights includes the autonomy of communities to worship, teach, and 
create institutions to provide ministry to others. Even though the social dimension of religious 
rights seems to be more potentially threatening to regime control, the individual and social 
dimension of religious rights both can happen in the public space and be in conflict with states. 
Therefore, it is necessary to study whether states actually conform with international law in the 
protection of the two dimensions of religious rights. 
In the field of religion and politics, scholars have mostly focused on the study of 
individual dimension of religious freedom and largely neglected the social dimension. Shah 
defines religious freedom as “a universal human right based on the reasons that religious 
freedom concerns the dignity and integrity for a human person and it is a right to explore, 
embrace and express the truth about an unseen order” (Shah 2012). However, the social 
dimension is inherent to religious freedom and is the communitarian aspect of religious freedom. 
Even though religious belief is individual, “religion is a social institution and its practice implies 
the existence of more than one participant.” (Scolnicov 2010, 65 ).   
How might states treat religious individuals and organizations differently? Religious 
individual rights and group rights are qualitatively different; religious individual rights have an 
emphasis on the expression of one’s belief, while the group rights are more about the group 
identity (Scolnicov 2010). Religious groups have a social, communitarian dimension. Therefore, 
the organized religions and religious expressions by organizations are more threatening to the 
political regimes, especially the autocracies. Religious organizations, such as churches, offer an 
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alternative authority to the religious believers. Churches have a great influence over religious 
believers through the weekly sermons, newsletters and other venues of theological and political 
views. Some organizations like religious schools and associations can also exert influence on the 
thoughts and views of religious believers.  Religious organizations are advantageous in 
organizing and mobilizing the individuals, so they can potentially challenge the authority of the 
government if they wish. Most of religions are transnational, therefore the religious organizations 
are well connected with other international religious organizations, which can also arouse 
suspicion from governments. For example, the Chinese government cracks down underground 
churches and is suspicious of the foreign influence on these churches. Therefore, it tries to 
appoint clergy leadership in Catholic churches to ensure loyalty to the Chinese government. 
Thus, an argument can be made that governments are more suspicious and mistrustful towards 
religious organizations than individuals and more motivated to restrict and constrain the 
organizations.  
On the other hand, governments are also more likely to change their practice towards 
religious organizations than individuals when they are under pressure from international 
community. First of all, religious groups enjoy higher visibility to the public, media, 
International Human Rights Organizations (HROs) and third-party states in comparison to the 
individuals. Restrictions on religious group rights are easier to be exposed and reported by the 
media and HROs. For example, the favoritism of the orthodox church by the Russian 
government is highly visible, but the persecution of the religious minorities is less visible. 
Additionally, the demolition of the churches, the arrest of the religious leaders, and governmental 
appointments of clergy in churches and religious organizations are frequently reported by media 
and HROs, but the reports on the persecution of the individual religious believers are rare. In 
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fact, the persecution of religious individuals, like the Baha'is in Iran and Yemen and Shias in 
Saudi Arabia, is widespread. If states' violations of human rights are more visibly reported by the 
media and human rights organizations, they cannot use the ratification of human rights laws as 
an expressive instrument to maintain a better standing and reputation on the international stage 
(Hathaway 2002). Therefore, states are more likely to change their practice in religious 
organizations because restrictions and regulations on religious organizations are more high 
profile and they are more pressured to take actions.  
Even though states are willing to improve the protection of religious freedom, it takes 
more efforts for states to protect religious rights for individuals than groups. Information in 
domestic judicial enforcement matters for the implementation of the human rights treaties (Lupu 
2013). Violations of the collective religious rights are easier to detect, and evidence is easier to 
gather, because the violations of religious group rights are in the public. In contrast, individual 
rights violations are harder to detect or collect, and states often deny such behaviors. For 
example, demolition of churches is easy to notice, while limitations on individual religious 
practice are harder to observe. Therefore, states have to pay more costs to protect religious rights 
for groups. In addition, religious groups represent organized interests and have more resources 
and influences, while individuals, plagued by collective actions problems, are less equipped to 
defend their rights.  Organized religion also has a higher bargaining power with the government. 
When the government has international legal commitment to improving religious practice, 
religious organizations are more equipped with information, resources and bargaining leverage 
than individuals. Therefore, governments are more likely to change their practice for 
organizations under pressure.  
Even if states are willing to protect human rights, the "principal-agent" problem may 
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cause a different level of human rights enforcement for group rights and individual rights 
(Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014, Englehart 2009). The central governments 
may sincerely want to improve religious freedom after ratifying the human rights treaty, but they 
might not be able to control what their agents – local governments and police - do, especially 
when central governments are weak or failing. Therefore, central governments may be better 
able to enforce "organizational rights" standards than "individual rights" standards, as the latter 
are more likely to be violated at the local level by state agents acting in their own self-interest as 
opposed to the interests of central government. 
Religious freedom inherently includes group and individual rights (Scolnicov 2010). 
Thus it would not be appropriate to assume that these two kinds of rights are affected by 
international law, human rights organization and globalization equally. Different mechanisms 
might take effect after the ratification of ICPPR, under the influence of HROs and globalization, 
on the two dimensions of religious freedom. To better understand how these forces influence 
states’ practice in international law, it is necessary to explore the key latent dimensions of 
religious freedom underlying the data and the impact of the international law, HROs and 
globalization on the two dimensions. 
The clear differences between individual and organizational freedoms warrants 
theoretical and empirical distinction. I thus employ two dependent variables in my empirical 
analyses. In constructing these variables, I rely on data from the RAS2 dataset (Religion and 
State Round 2).  The results of a factor analysis, presented in Chapter 3, support my conjecture 
about the dual nature of religious freedoms. The two factors are derived from the government 
religious restriction index (NX) from the RAS2 dataset. The NX index is about government 
restrictions on all religions and majority religions, and it comprehensively covers government 
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religious restrictions in various dimensions (Fox 2015, 267). The results of my exploratory factor 
analysis indicate that there are two latent dimensions in Fox’s religious restriction index (RAS 2) 
(Fox 2015), which is consistent with Scolnicov (2010)’s theory. 
1.2 The International Politics of Religious Freedom  
 The international system has transformed in significant ways since WWII. The global 
community has made efforts to institutionalize human rights at the international level, 
challenging our traditional understanding of state sovereignty. The UDHR established baseline 
norms on which more formal international human rights laws were established. Even though 
states may not want to be parties to human rights treaties, international human rights 
organizations (IHROs) pressure governments to adopt and internalize human rights norms, and 
to improve human rights practices (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Globalization is an 
irreversible trend. It connects people and governments transnationally in goods, services and 
values, and influences the interactions between governments and individuals.  
Studies in international human rights have identified various important domestic factors 
influencing states authorities’ decision to respect human rights norms: democratic regime, 
economic development, population, civil wars and conflicts, etc. The influence of international 
forces such as international law, human rights activism and globalization, on the cost-benefit 
analysis of states on repression is less conclusive and begs more research. While human rights 
outcomes are determined, in many ways, by the willingness of states to adhere to human rights 
norms, the push for human rights improvement comes as much from without as it does from 
within. It is for above reasons that the study of human rights is as much about international 
politics as it is domestic politics. In this study of spiritual integrity rights, I am focusing more on 
the former. Specifically, I will build a comprehensive framework to look at the effect of 
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international law, IHRO activism, and globalization on how states treat religious individuals and 
groups differently. 
Most countries have voluntarily committed themselves to the norms and values found in 
the UDHR. Subsequently, more and more countries have formally ratified human rights treaties 
to further their legal commitments in protection of civil, political, economic and cultural rights. 
In the study of how international law affects the protection of human rights, early works 
emphasized the weakness of international instruments owing to the lack of any credible 
enforcement mechanism, and mostly have indicated that states are insincere in ratifying 
international law and do not follow through their legal commitments (Keith 1999 ,Hathaway 
2002, Hafner‐Burton and Tsutsui 2005, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). With the refinement of 
measurement and analytical methods, more studies have shown a positive effect of international 
law on human rights (Landman 2004, Landman 2005, Hill 2010, Neumayer 2005) (Fariss 2017).  
I take up the question how international law influences the protection of individual and 
group religious rights in Chapter 4. The main independent variable in this chapter is Ratification 
of ICCPR ( Ratificationyear ), which is operationalized as the years after ratification of ICCPR. 
It measures the duration of ICCPR has been in effect. The ICCPR is chosen as the only treaty 
that protects religious freedom and upholds the values in UDHR. Data on the ratification by 
country and year is collected from the United Nations Treaty Collection website.  The results of 
my statistical analysis reveal divergent effects of international law on the protection of rights of 
religious organizations and individuals. The ratification of ICCPR leads to better protection of 
religious rights for organizations, while it actually deteriorates the protection of religious rights 
for individuals. The longer states have ratified ICCPR, the bigger the positive effect of ICCPR 
on the protection of religious rights for organizations. ICCPR is useful in the protection of 
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religious rights for organizations but not for individual rights. States comply with international 
norms in religious freedom due to external pressures, but they tend to worsen their behavior in 
religious repression for religious individuals.  
Human rights advocacy groups also play an increasingly important role in human rights 
improvement. Even though states might not be sincere at first when they join human rights 
treaties and organizations, eventually they will internalize human rights norms and change their 
practice to be consistent with norms under the pressure of HROs (Heather 2012, Risse, Ropp, 
and Sikkink 1999). Naming and shaming campaigns by HROs increase costs for rights violations 
and force states to comply with international human rights norms. Would the local presence of 
HROs and direct targeting by HROs influence the rights protection for religious individuals and 
groups differently? 
I consider the question of how HROs influence the protection of religious individual and 
group rights in Chapter 5. HROs is measured by the number of international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations with a human rights 
focus with members or volunteers in a specific country in a specific year (J. Smith and Wiest 
2005). I find that HROs have a positive effect on the rights protection of religious organizations, 
but do not have any effects on the protection of individual religious rights. HROs mobilize 
religious groups in social movements for human rights and mediate between them and the 
governments to reduce the repercussions from the political disruptions. Therefore, governments 
are forced to change their policy and practice towards religious groups with the help of local 
HROs. Naming and shaming by HROs have an effect on the improvement of religious right for 
individuals but not for groups, because direct targeting by transnational advocacy networks 
provide new information to the international audience about the restrictions on religious 
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individuals, therefore, they are able to raise reputational costs and reduce restrictions on religious 
individuals. 
In addition to the institutional developments in human rights on the state and grassroots 
level, the contextual change in the global environment cannot be ignored. As globalization 
deepens, the world is more and more interconnected politically, economically and socially. 
Waves of democratization have led more and more countries to detach from authoritarianism and 
adopt democratic ideals and norms, which are usually beneficial to the protection of human 
rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Рое, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Richards, 
Gelleny, and Sacko 2001, Hathaway 2002, Dai 2005). As more and more countries start to trade 
with each other and invest in others, countries are more connected economically. Countries are 
also connected further through cultural ties such as communications, education and movies, thus 
more and more individuals share the norms in human rights. Studies have shown mixed findings 
about the effect of economic globalization on religious freedom (W. Meyer 1998; Richards, 
Gelleny, and Sacko 2001;Hafner-Burton 2003; Hafner-Burton 2005). Overall, the effect of 
globalization is still not conclusive.  
I grapple with the question of how globalization influences the protection of religious 
individual and group rights in Chapter 6. Globalization is measured by The KOF index of 
Globalization by Swiss Economic Institute. It conceptualizes globalization as a process that 
“erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and 
governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence” (KOF Globalization 
Index codebook, 2016). The overall index includes economic, social, and political dimensions of 
globalization. In each dimension, the index is both measured in the de jure aspect of 
globalization and the de facto aspect. My findings indicate that globalization actually contributes 
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to the increase of religious restrictions on organizations but not on individuals. When nationalist 
movements push back against globalization, governments are more inclined to restrict the 
religious activities by churches, schools, associations and parties, because religious groups are 
more threatening to the state authorities, and religious groups seek for more institutionalized 
forms to strengthen their identity in globalization.  
Collectively, the results from these three empirical studies imply that there are myriad, 
sometimes counter-acting processes at work; and they tell us something important about how 
interactional forces affect not only religious rights, but human rights more broadly. I discuss the 
“bigger picture” implications of this dissertation in Chapter 7. But before proceeding with my 
original research, it is important to first root this study in the existing literature. I turn now to a 
review of the mainstream scientific work on human rights in both theory and practice. 
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2 Literature Review  
With the diffusion of human rights norms in the world, most countries are parties 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and human rights treaties. Human rights are 
universally recognized and have been evolving as human society progresses, even though the 
concept of human rights is derived from western thoughts, and developed as a response to the 
emergence of modern state and market (Donnelly 2013a). Human rights are essentially derived 
from the respect for the dignity of human life.  The source of human rights is man’s moral 
nature, which is only loosely linked to human nature by scientifically ascertainable needs. It is 
assumed that people will live a richer and fuller human life if they enjoy human rights. Based on 
a moral vision of human nature, human rights set the limits and requirements of social and state 
action (p14, Donnelly 2013a).   
However, states do not necessarily behave within the limits of human rights. States 
violate human rights norms and engage in political violence against their citizens according to 
reports by international human rights organizations. It is often assumed in most studies that states 
repress their citizens based on strategic policies to pursue important political and military 
objectives. Empirical research has investigated the causes of repression, specifically the 
conditions and incentives that make these strategies more likely. This chapter will review factors 
explaining variation in human rights protections by state officials across countries. I argue that 
the current scholarship in human rights studies has narrowly focused on physical integrity rights, 
and this limitation hinders the empirical and theoretical development of human rights studies and 
comes with normative consequences. I propose to expand the study of human rights into 
religious rights, and examine how international forces influence the protection of religious rights 
for individuals and groups. In the following paragraphs, I will first review the current scholarship 
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in factors explaining variation in human rights condition across countries, then explain why it is 
necessary to further probe how international forces influence the protection of religious rights 
protection for individuals and groups.  
2.1 Explaining Human Rights Variation 
                  Since the ground-breaking study by Poe and Tate (1994), scholars have made great 
efforts to answer the quests of why states put limitations on rights their citizens are entitled to, 
and why some states tend to repress their citizens less and some others tend to repress more. 
Scholars have discovered some domestic and international factors contribute the governments’ 
decision to repress. The most common approach has been taken is decision making theoretical 
model, which focuses on conditions which make repressive tactics costlier or more beneficial to 
political leaders. In this model, repression is costly, and political authorities are rational actors 
and their main concern is to remain in political office and power. Their most desired outcome is 
to continue the status quo and political quiescence in the population  (Davenport 2007). 
Therefore, states will make an assessment of threats to their rule and a cost-benefit analysis by 
engaging in various policies to defeat challengers.  
However, even when authorities’ rule of the states is threatened, states still have different 
options to cope with the threat. States have a tool box to cope with political threats ranging from 
winning elections through the support of public opinion in democracies, granting symbolic 
concessions, buying off possible opposition through private side payments and social benefits, to 
repression or violations of physical integrity rights. Why use repression instead of other 
pacification? The costs are different in using different tools to handle political opposition or 
threats depending on the skills and expertise of repressive tools or the perceived threats which 
might vary in type and severity (Pierskalla 2010). Rulers conduct cost and benefit analysis and 
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decide whether they would apply repressive measures to stay in power. Elites decide to use 
repression when economic costs are lower than costs of institutional and liberal democracy  
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  “It is assumed that the larger or more significant the threat, the 
more likely the state will be to apply repressive measures, all else being equal” (p 928, Nordås 
and Davenport 2013). The type and frequency of behavioral challenge also matters, for example, 
ethnical or racial characteristics of perceived challengers are important for the degree of threat 
perceived and the likely repressive response from the state (Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 
2011).  
Poe updates the decision-making model basing on the conceptual model by Most and 
Starr (1989), which assumes that state officials as decision makers are rational actors (Poe 2004). 
They are unified and value-maximizing and possess perfect information regarding all options and 
their consequences. There are three factors influencing whether state authorities adopt repressive 
measures: their perception of their regimes’ political strength in domestic domain, their 
perception of the probability that a domestic threat will topple their regime, and the ratio of the 
strength to the threat (Poe 2004). When leaders perceive that the regime’s strength is less than 
the threat or that the threat is increasing relative to strength, they are motivated to take an action 
to increase their strength or decrease the threat to their regime. However, since there are multiple 
options for state officials to choose, and it is not appropriate to assume states would always 
choose to repress. For example, state officials might choose to make concessions to diffuse the 
threat or seek foreign aid to increase their domestic strength. Using this model, Poe is able to 
provide an integrative assessment of the findings on repression (Poe 2004). 
Another theoretical model used to explain the variation in human rights abuse is the 
principal agent model. This model assumes that state authorities are the agents of citizens and are 
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willing to prioritize human rights protections and prefer a high level of human rights protections. 
However, there are factors influencing to what extent the agents are motivated to do what 
principal wants. Repression is not a choice by states, rather it is due to state failure. When state 
capacity is weak with low tax revenues, corruption, and lack of law and order, state officials in 
central government are not motivated to protect human rights (Englehart 2009). In addition, even 
when central governments are willing to protect human rights, they might lose control of local 
officials and police, who can commit human rights abuses at a local level. Absence of 
restrictions on the power of authority and weaknesses of democratic institutions can be identified 
as enabling repression.  
There seems to be two sets of principal agent relationships: citizens act as the principal 
and politicians and bureaucrats are the agents; politicians act as principal and bureaucrats, police 
and local governments are agents. Which relationship is more salient and critical? I argue that the 
type of principal agent relationship is contingent on the regime type. Liberal democracies are 
built upon the social contract theory by John Locke, which envisions the citizens as the principal 
and the agents as elected officials and bureaucrats. However, it is not appropriate to assume this 
type of principal agent relationship applies for all countries. In fact, state elites are not 
necessarily accountable to all citizens in authoritarian countries. They are most accountable to 
citizens in the majority groups. States officials and bureaucrats are willing to discriminate and 
repress minority citizens to gain support from the majority citizens. Therefore, they are agents to 
the majority citizens. The real principal agent relationship in authoritarian states is that 
politicians/political elites are principal, and bureaucrats, police and local government are agents. 
              In authoritarian states, state elite preferences are not consistent with citizens, who 
always prefer a better protection of human rights.  In fact, state elites’ primary goal is the 
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stability of their rule of the country. Authoritarian leaders often perceive the relationship between 
human rights protection and their authoritarian rule as incompatible. Local governments and 
bureaucrats are agents of the central government. When the bureaucrats, police and local 
government officials get financially compensated better by tax revenues, they might put on more 
efforts to repress citizens in a larger scale.  
Based on the above theoretical models, scholars have conducted large N cross national 
studies and generated fruitful empirical research in the field of international human rights.  I will 
discuss the main factors contributing to states’ repressions.  
2.1.1 Domestic Factors 
2.1.1.1 Democracy 
Democracy has been the most consistent predictor of human rights violations since the 
study of Poe and Tate (1994). The domestic democratic peace thesis states that democratic 
regimes are less likely to engage in the repression of personal liberties (Davenport 2007; Poe and 
Tate 1994b; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The common explanation is that the cost of repression is 
higher in more democratic societies where citizens can hold leaders accountable for and sanction 
repressive behavior; cost of repression is lower in authoritarian regimes. Elections offer 
opportunities for oppressed to remove oppressors, so democracy imposes higher costs for the 
repressive policy and behaviors by states. Also, democracy provides the established and 
nonviolent mechanisms to address grievances with peaceful contestation. However, there is not a 
linear relationship between democracy and repression: repression levels are high in transitioning 
regimes (Snyder 2000), and democratic institutions only contribute to decreased repression after 
a certain threshold is reached (De Mesquita et al. 2005). Transitions to and from democracy 
affect repression, and democratization tends to increase states repressive behavior, especially 
political restrictions (Davenport 2004).  
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However, there has been doubts over the strong correlations between democracy and 
lesser degree of repression. One argument is that the strong connection between democracy and 
human rights protection is due to how democracy is measured in most of studies. Governments 
that target political opposition with violence are less democratic by definition, given the way 
democracy is usually defined and operationalized. In the measurements of the political rights by 
Freedom House and the Polity score by Systemic Peace, democracy is to some extent measured 
by whether states adopt repressive measures and restrict the political rights of citizens. Thus, 
there might be endogeneity problems.  
There is a need for disaggregating democracy and its effects on repression in future 
analyses. Studies also have done to explain which aspects of democracy are most strongly related 
to repression (De Mesquita et al. 2005). Some institutions of a democratic regime have greater 
effects on repression levels than others (Davenport 2004). Executive constraints have been 
identified as having the greatest effect on repression levels (De Mesquita et al. 2005) with regard 
to personal integrity rights. Various domestic legal institutions also have effect on state 
repression (Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009;  Powell and Staton 2009). Constitutions and courts are 
useful for generating credible commitments on the part of the government to observe limits on its 
authority and refrain from encroaching on rights. Authoritarian political regimes are not 
necessarily bad for human right. Authoritarian elected legislatures reduce repression and the 
presence of opposition parties increases it (Rivera 2017).   
2.1.1.2 Wars and Conflicts  
Leaders perceive repression to be more useful as real or perceived threats to their 
position in power increase, which is consistent with the idea that repression is a response to 
internal or external political challenges (Davenport 1995; Gurr 1986). However, there might be a 
reciprocal relationship between dissent and repression. Different domestic dissent influences the 
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risk of state sponsored violence differently. Guerrilla warfare increases the probability of 
repression onset significantly (Carey 2010). Studies have found that real or imagined threats a 
regime consistently motivate leaders to choose repression (Poe 2004). For example, states 
authorities’ control of the states is often threatened during civil or international wars, therefore, 
states resort to repression to fight back the opposite side in wars to maintain their control of the 
countries (Poe and Tate 1994b). Also, when there are separationist movements and insurgent 
terrorists exist in states, the security and stability of the states are not guaranteed and authorities 
can’t get support of their citizens. Therefore, they will resort to repression under these 
circumstances  (Poe and Tate 1994a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). New studies have found that 
even civil wars happening in neighboring countries will also increase the chance of repression 
domestically, because states anticipate contagious rebellion and preempt with repression  
(Danneman and Ritter 2014). The number of terrorist attacks is also positively related to the 
worse state repression (Shor et al. 2014). Even the signs of conflicts such as arms importation is 
related to worsened human rights (Blanton 1999).  
2.1.1.3 Economic Development 
Studies have found that poor countries are more repressive than rich countries (Poe and 
Tate 1994a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Mitchell and McCormick 1988).The explanation is that 
poor nations experience more competition for fewer resources, thus privileging repression as one 
of few options for a government intent on staying in power. For example, increases in food 
insecurity substantially raise the likelihood of insurgent groups committing violence against 
civilians, which leads to more repression (Rezaeedaryakenari, Landis, and Thies 2017). Second, 
others claim that a lack of resources makes repression less efficient and forces government to 
engage in more of it (Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, new studies have found that the 
abundance of resources might not necessarily reduces repression. State reliance on natural 
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resource rents, rather than tax revenue, affects incentives for governments to use repression 
(Conrad and DeMeritt 2013). The discovery of natural resources like oil actually leads to civil 
wars, less economic growth and more repression, because political leaders rely less on tax 
revenues and ballot support (Conrad and DeMeritt 2013). 
However, choice of indicators and measurements has a significant impact on the 
reliability of results in empirical studies. Aggregate data of GNP of other components of 
economic development ignores possible effects of domestic distribution of wealth  (Henderson 
1991; Landman and Larizza 2009) and leaves questions open that seek to identify the exact 
mechanism linking economic development to human rights. The level of economic development 
is positively related to states’ respect for human rights according to past research (Mitchell and 
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994a; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009). 
Specifically, stronger economies have fewer government religious restrictions (Grim and Finke 
2010). However, the effects of economic growth are mixed. Economic growth can expand the 
resource base and reduce the economic and social stress, so the governments are less likely to 
use repression. On the other hand, rapid economic growth also can increase instability which 
induce the states to resort to coercion (Poe and Tate 1994a). 
2.1.1.4 Population 
A large number of people tend to place a stress on resources and dissent movements 
(Poe and Tate 1994a) and large population growth rates are apt to be confronted with burgeoning 
demands (Henderson 1993). In addition, a larger population presents more of a control problem 
because political leaders need more social control to stay in power (Henderson 1993). Therefore, 
one should expect to find more repressive state action in more populous countries than in less 
populous ones. Scholars also argue that the real factor is not general population size, but rather 
the youth population, which is most rebellious portion of the whole population. States perceive 
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the youth bulges as a threat to their power, interests and supporters, and increase the level of 
repression (Nordås and Davenport 2013). Historically youth has been the leading force in social 
movements such as Tiananmen Square protests and Arab Spring. Youth bulge is negatively 
related to rights protection, because governments are proactive with respect of youth bulges and 
implement various policies to minimize the threat from the rebelliousness of youth (Nordås and 
Davenport 2013). 
2.1.1.5 State Capacity 
 According to the principal agent theory, state leaders might want to protect human 
rights for their citizens, but they are not able to do so because of states failure. Agency loss and 
inability to implement policies effectively can lead to human rights abuses by private individuals 
and rogue agents of the state (Englehart 2009a). Reliance of taxes make politicians more willing 
to protect human rights and raises in bureaucratic compensation can help create a more 
accountable bureaucracy. Therefore, increased tax revenues is positively related rights protection 
(Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014). In addition, state leaders can also be 
principal, and police and local governments can be agents in rights protection. In this case, police 
and local governments make independent contribution to the level of repression. When they are 
given enough financial compensation, they will be likely to avoid bribery or act for hidden 
motives. Empirical findings support that perceived levels of financial corruption substantially 
influence the incidence of torture in a political system (Bohara et al. 2008).  
2.1.2 International Factors   
              The study of international factors in the protection of human rights is a recent trend. 
Scholars have made efforts to understand the international factors contributing to a better 
protection of human rights. Much of this work also adopts an essentially decision-theoretic 
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approach – various international influences affect the costs/benefits to potential leaders for using 
repression. Just like the domestic factors, international forces are expected to raise the perceived 
costs of violence and discourage states to repress, even though repression is still prevalent. 
External structural factors such as influence of signing and ratifying treaties (E. M. Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2007) (Hathaway 2002), naming and shaming (Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 
2008a; Barry, Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013b), and international trade agreements (Emilie M. 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005) can impose costs on repressive leaders and therefore reduce the 
amount of repression. However, the findings are mixed according to the large n quantitative 
studies. 
2.1.2.1 Globalization 
The empirical studies have shown mixed findings on relationships between 
globalization and human rights protections. Studies find that globalization and economic 
freedom contribute to a better protection of physical integrity rights, but no effect on 
empowerment rights such as religious freedom, women’ rights, etc. Due to the consensus about 
the appropriate level of empowerment rights as compared to the outright rejection of any 
violation of physical integrity rights, the global community is presumably less effective in 
promoting empowerment rights (Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012).  
Based on different measurements of economic openness and integration, the results can 
be different. Using Foreign Direct Investment as a proxy of economic globalization, cross 
national studies find that multinational corporations, foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment are positively related with political, civil rights, and economic, social rights in the 
third world (Grim and Finke 2010; W. H. Meyer 1996; W. Meyer 1998) , which supports the 
theory proposed by the neo-liberalism. Using alternative measures of human rights practice, 
economic globalization, and new data analysis methods, studies finds the relationship between 
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economic integration and human rights record almost does not exist or negative. (Smith, 
Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999; Milner 1998; Sorens and Ruger 2012).  
Studies in the institutions and policies promoting economic globalization find that 
international trade agreements transform government observance of human rights today, because 
they provide governments with the interests and the incentives to implement domestic human 
rights policies and decrease their employment of repressive practices (Hafner-Burton 2003; 
Hafner-Burton 2005). WTO also plays an important role in bringing trade practices in line with 
human rights objectives. Transnational corporations not only benefit human rights by promoting 
economic development, but also have the culture to conduct business with an eye toward the 
bigger good (Kinley 2009). Transnational mergers and acquisitions have a positive impact on 
human rights conditions including physical integrity rights, empowerment rights, workers’ rights 
and women’s economic rights (D.-H. Kim and Trumbore 2010).  
Participation in IMF and World bank structural adjustment programs has a positive 
relationship with repression (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). 
Structural characteristics are related to state repression because they alter the costs of repression 
for states. Overall indebtedness is related to human rights abuses, but the higher the stock of debt 
owed to IFIs relative to total debt, the lower the HR violations. Accumulating debt to IFIs seems 
to improve the level of human rights. A higher government consumption to GDP ratio reduces 
human rights, because government that are capable of commanding a higher share of the 
country’s wealth are less likely to face threatening social dissent (Eriksen and de Soysa 2009).  
Economic sanctions are not effective in reducing the level of human rights abuse. 
Imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state 
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by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Sanctions threaten the stability of target 
incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an efforts to stabilize the 
regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress 
popular dissent  (Wood 2008). Rulers whose budget constraints are severely constrained by 
sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support 
groups. When budget constraints are severe due to economic sanctions, dictators are more likely 
to increase repression (Escribà-Folch 2012).  
2.1.2.2 Human Rights Treaties 
International legal agreements have effects on human rights practices (Conrad and Ritter 
2013; Fariss 2017; Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Keith 1999; Lupu 2013; Powell and Staton 2009; 
Simmons 2009a). Some studies find that treaty ratification seems not to be effective in reducing 
repression (Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Keith 1999). Other studies find that the influences 
depend on factors such as the NGO presence (Neumayer 2005), expected tenure of political 
leaders (Conrad and Ritter 2013), and legal standards of proof for particular rights violations 
(Lupu 2013).  
The early research on the effect of international law on human rights practice is rather 
pessimistic; the effect is either non-existent or negative (E. M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; 
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Keith 1999). Some argue that the 
human rights treaty failed because of the weak implementation mechanism and rely too much on 
the goodwill of the party states (Keith 1999; Neumayer 2005). Thus, repressive states can get 
away with human rights violations with low costs after the ratification of human rights treaties. 
Others argue that states sometimes ratify treaties to avoid criticism associated with remaining 
outside of the regime, but they do not really comply with international law in action, since it was 
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an insincere ratification in the first place. Thus, the compliance often can be replaced by position 
taking in an international community (Hathaway 2002). The effect of a treaty on a state is 
determined by the domestic enforcement of the treaty and the treaty’s collateral consequences. 
States with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to commit to human rights treaties if 
they have poor human rights records, because there is little prospect that the treaties will be 
enforced. States with more democratic institutions will be less likely to commit to human rights 
treaties if they have poor human rights records – because treaties are likely to lead to changes in 
behavior. Other scholars argue that authoritarian countries actually use the signing of the treaties 
to signal to opposition groups domestically that they will remain in power by repressive actions, 
thus treaty ratification is used to prolong the tenure of autocratic leaders and attract foreign aid  
(Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011). However, it is still quite perplexing why the effects of human 
rights sometimes are negative if not zero. 
            More recent works have recognized the weaknesses in the early works’ methods and 
theories and updated our understandings of the effect of human rights treaties (Simmons and 
Hopkins 2005). Selection bias in estimating treaty effects do not negate the constraining effect of 
human rights treaties. Using preprocessing matching step, treaty effects are significant.  
After accounting for selection effects methodologically in their studies, scholars find that states 
with better human rights practices tend to ratify more human rights treaties (Von Stein 2005); so 
the relationship between treaty and human rights practice can be positive and more nuanced  
(Hill 2010; Landman 2004, 2005; Neumayer 2005). Data inflation is another problem in human 
rights study. After accounting for the increased accountability by INGOs human rights reports in 
recent years due to increased information, better data collecting methods and enhanced human 
rights standards, a new study reveals that ratification is positively related to the human rights 
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protections (Fariss 2017; Conrad and Ritter 2013). International human rights treaties are argued 
to increase both the likelihood of domestic mobilized dissent and judicial restraint. Mobilized 
challenges undermine a leader’s position in power, increasing incentives to repress; courts raise 
the probability of litigation, decreasing incentives to repress. Politically insecure leaders, 
desperate to retain power, repress to control the destabilizing effects of dissent. Secure leaders 
are less likely to fall to citizen pressures, but the probability of facing an effective judiciary 
weighs heavily in their expected costs. They repress less to avoid litigation. Treaties have no 
effect on repression in states with insecure leaders but have a positive effect on rights protection 
in states headed by secure leaders.  
2.1.2.3 Human Rights Activism 
              The global civil society, HROs, and western media activities have an impact on human 
rights practice (Franklin 2008a; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 2008a; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui 2005; A. M. Murdie and Davis 2012a). The impact of HROs presence on repression has 
been found to be negative, while results concerning the effects of naming and shaming are more 
mixed. HROs and coordinated efforts between groups and foreign governments in the form of 
transnational advocacy networks (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) may lead to a regime to perceive 
an increase in the costs associated with repression, thus leading them to be more moderate in 
their actions than they would otherwise be.  
International human rights organizations (HROs) are useful in the protection of human 
rights. Domestic presence of HROs can pressure the oppressing regimes from below through the 
support for local social movements, and HROs can also pressure the states from above through 
the third party states by citing the reports of HROs (Brysk 1993). Shaming works the best when 
there is domestic presence of HROs within the targeted states and/or pressure by third party 
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states (A. M. Murdie and Davis 2012a). Shaming not only is able to directly change states’ 
behaviors, but it can constrain states indirectly by influencing foreign direct investments (Barry, 
Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013b). States are also expected to have better human rights practice and 
better compliance with international law when they have joined more inter-governmental 
organizations, because violation of their legal obligations in the international communities 
magnifies shaming effects (Goodman and Jinks 2004; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
2005; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). There is also a bigger chance that violators get named and 
shamed on the international stage like the United Nations (Barry, Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013b). 
In the spiral model of human rights norm diffusion, international human rights organizations are 
a driving force for human rights protection (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Domestic groups 
bring human rights issues to the attention of HROs, and HROs pressure states to ratify human 
rights treaties. At first states ratify treaties to make concessions and avoid criticism, but the real 
changes in human rights practice can happen due to the continued pressures from HROs and 
third parties. States go through the process of institutional changes to be consistent with human 
rights norms through years after ratification and, eventually, internalize those norms. Therefore, 
HROs positively modify the effect of ratification on human rights improvement. In other words, 
HROs enhance and support the effect of treaty ratification on human rights (Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009a). 
A new study using experiments has found that NGOs are more effective in addressing 
individual level discriminations than the institutional changes in the top down process. However, 
the NGOs activities actively engaging majority and minority groups are more effective in 
reducing discrimination than activities only providing aid to the minority groups (Bracic 2016a). 
Human rights criticism leads to governments to reduce repression of subsequent challenges in 
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cases where there are relatively strong economic ties to other countries. Criticism by NGOs, 
religious groups and foreign governments was more effective than criticism from inter-
governmental organizations (Franklin 2008a). Another effective tool for human rights 
improvement is prosecutions of individual perpetrators. Prosecutions are associated with 
improvement in future human rights conditions (H. J. Kim and Sikkink 2012).  
2.2 Going Beyond Physical Integrity Rights – A Case for Studying 
Religious Rights 
Having examined factors explaining the variation in human rights, it is apparent that most 
studies in human rights have focused on physical integrity rights or repression. Even though 
violations of physical integrity rights are the most egregious kind of violation of human rights, 
narrowly focusing on this kind of rights hinders theoretical development in exploration of the 
motivation of states’ violation of human rights. 
Violation of physical integrity rights are also referred as state terrorism and repression. In 
their groundbreaking study, Poe and Tate defined these rights as the “category of coercive 
activities on the part of the government designed to induce compliance in others.” These 
activities include murder, torture, forced disappearance and imprisonment (Poe and Tate 1994a). 
They justified physical integrity rights as the subject of study for human rights for following 
reasons: these violations of physical integrity rights are most egregious and severe crimes against 
humanity, and doing so can separate the concept human rights from related concepts such as 
democracy and economic standing (Poe and Tate 1994a). However, empirical findings indicate 
that predicators of human rights abuse take different effects on different kinds of human rights 
abuse. Hill and Jones (2014) discovered that different kinds of repressive acts might be driven by 
different processes, therefore human rights are not homogenous and they should be 
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disaggregated in measurements of human rights. The measurement of human rights abuse by 
PTS and CIRI focuses on physical integrity rights and might be limited in the examination of 
broader scope of human rights. States can have different motivations for human rights violations 
in different kinds of rights. The category of physical integrity rights is driven by the severity of 
the human rights violations, not based on the natures of human rights abuse. Therefore, 
motivations and causes of different kinds of abuse might be different. Physical integrity rights 
violation can be driven by different causes: political threat, ideological differences, 
discriminations based on identities such as gender, race, ethnicity and religion. Killings and 
disappearances can happen due to the struggles between state officials and the citizens for 
religious rights, workers’ rights, women’ rights and etc. Not knowing the nature of the repression 
hinders the theoretical development in the study of states motivations of human rights abuse.  
There are some normative consequences too for focusing too much on physical integrity 
rights. Any lesser degree of human rights abuse can develop into physical integrity rights abuse 
if we do not study the motivations of these kinds of human rights and take preventative 
measures. For example, religious restrictions and discriminations can lead to religious 
persecutions, which is the violent forms of religious rights violations (Grim and Finke 2005). 
Human rights abuses are interdependent. Rights violations are generally likely to co-occur with a 
network analysis (Farris and Schnakenberg 2014). Therefore, these less violent violations of 
rights for women, children, workers, and religious population should be important subjects of 
study in the realm of human rights.  
Study of the abuse of religious rights is an important step in this direction to address the 
above problem. The study of human rights should not only focus on physical integrity, but also 
spiritual integrity, which contains the rights of souls to freely express their beliefs individually and 
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collectively. Major UN human rights instruments such as UDHR, 1981 Declaration, and ICCPR 
all have recognized religious freedom as a human right. However, religious restrictions and 
discrimination have been increasing in the past decade (Pew Research Center Report 2018). 
Organized religions often arouse states’ suspicion and pose a potential threat to the autocratic 
rulers, therefore, autocracies tend to have a higher level of religious restrictions (Sarkissian 2015).  
Religious discrimination is also widespread and exists not only in autocracies but also in 
democracies. Religious minorities often become the targets of nationalist movements. Despite 
these trends, religious rights are marginalized in the scientific study of human rights. Scholars have 
not incorporated religious freedom in the framework of human rights study to examine why states 
restrict religions and how to better realize religious freedom.   
There are also philosophical grounds for right to religious freedom. Arguments for 
religious freedom (or at least toleration) were central to the grand liberal tradition, as embodied in 
such works as John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration in the 17th Century and James Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance in the 18th.   
Having witnessed the civil authorities enforcing religious doctrine during colonial period, 
Roger Williams, a Puritan minister and theologian, stood up against the Puritan authorities and 
argued for religious freedom and the separation of church and state. In Bloody Tenet of Persecution 
of the Cause of Faith, he argues that soul liberty is gift of God, and no one is entitled to coerce 
“the sacred haven of conscience” through which each person communicated with the divine. He 
also argues against religious discriminations: all have soul freedom and liberty of conscience 
because all are stamped with Imago Dei. Civil authorities are not competent judges of the spiritual, 
and churches are not pure if they are supported by the state, therefore, he argues for the separation 
of church and state to protect religious freedom (Williams 1644).  
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John Locke echoed William’s theological themes and further developed philosophical 
grounds for religious freedom in A Letter Concerning Toleration. Locke states that Church and 
civil laws should be governed separately as one who is competent in religious affairs is not 
competent in judicial matters and vice versa. He argues that civil authority should only attend civil 
matters, and the salvation is a matter of individual responsibility and not subject to civil authority. 
Religious freedom can prevent civil unrest, and society should distinguish exactly the business of 
civil government from that of religion. Religious freedom is not only fundamentally good but also 
instrumental. He also argues for religious toleration – “every man may enjoy the same rights that 
are granted to others” (Locke 2013).  
As an example of the successful experiment in religious freedom, framers in the U.S. have 
provided compelling arguments for religious freedom. Due to the belief that Christianity morality 
cultivates civic virtue, which is the key for the survival of the young Democratic Republic, Patrick 
Henry proposed a bill to provide tax-supported religious instructions for Virginians.  However, a 
majority of lawmakers disagreed, including James Madisen. He argued that religious liberty is a 
natural right and no law or any government could be concerned with religious beliefs and practices 
in “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” (Madison 1785). He argues for 
the separation of church and state and how religions strive without the interference of civil 
authority. Limited government would promote a civil society in which people of different faiths 
could maintain their beliefs according to their own consciences. Religious establishment will breed 
corruption within the church, thus the bill violated equality which ought to be the basis of every 
law. Civil government and religion can operate efficiently without the other and unity between 
them will cause strife between magistrates and people being ruled. Madisen’s argument propelled 
an important change in 1786 when Virginia passed the Statute for Religious Freedom, drafted by 
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Thomas Jefferson, the new law served as a model for the first Amendment, which established 
federal protection for religious freedom and a ban on government established religion. 
In addition, religious freedom is also an internationally recognized universal human right. 
Article 18 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 declared that religious freedom is a 
universal human right, because “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood”. Therefore, religious rights are grounded in the dignity of all human persons.  
There are also instrumental reasons why the study of religious freedom is important. 
Religious freedom is conducive to democracy and protection other civil liberties such as women’s 
rights. Modern liberal democracy, after all, emerged out of the wars of religion and the conscious 
efforts by statesmen to craft regimes of toleration that would tamp down destabilizing religious 
strife.  According to Alfred Stepan’s “Twin Toleration” thesis, liberal democracy depends on states 
tolerating religious institutions to operate freely and religions tolerate states’ authority in civil 
matters (Stepan 2000). Huntington also argues that the theological embrace of religious freedom 
by Catholic church enabled it to catalyze the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993). 
The free practice of Christian missionaries also played a big role in the spread of democracy 
(Woodberry 2012). Studies also find religious freedom is positively correlated with women’s 
empowerment (Grim and Finke 2010), and government and social restrictions are associated with 
gender inequality (Grim and Lyon 2015). Full religious freedom, including the options of “exit 
and voice”, empowers women (R. Shah 2016).  
Religious freedom also might lead to economic flourishing. Gill argues that lowering 
religious restrictions leads to religious diversity in a society, which facilitates trade, 
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entrepreneurship and growth of economic activities, and there are economic incentives for states 
to relax religious restrictions (Gill 2013). Freedom of religion also attracts creative, risk-taking 
and pioneering individuals and group who increases the rate of economic growth (Gill and Owen 
2017). On the other hand, government restrictions on religion produce social hostilities, which 
would undermine economic growth (Grim, Clark, and Snyder 2014). Another study makes a 
qualification on the above research and indicates that religious favoritism is bad for economic 
growth, but the restrictions preventing majority religion holding too much advantages are good for 
economy  (Alon, Li, and Wu 2017).  
Religious freedom also is a strategic factor in U.S. foreign policy. Farr argues that 
promoting religious freedom fits America’s  national interests, because religious freedom 
addresses the problems of terrorism, fanaticism, religious conflict and despotism (Farr 2008). 
Religion has experienced a comeback in the twentieth first century due to modernization and 
globalization and exerts great political influence, thus the restrictions of religion often lead to wars 
and chaos (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011), and persecution and violence (Grim and Finke 2010). 
Therefore, religious freedom is an important condition for peace and stability. Religious 
restrictions also lead to religious terrorism and violence, because restrictive environment facilitate 
radical theologies. Religious liberty is a weapon of peace to combat terrorism (Saiya 2018). 
Repressions promote militant political theologies, which is a key threat to stability and peace. One 
the other hand, various religious groups in the U.S. have joined forces together and led the faith 
based activism work for international human rights, and shaped American foreign policy (Hertzke 
2006). 
2.3 Research on Religious Freedom 
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 Although most empirical studies in human rights have focused on physical integrity rights, 
there is a small body of work on religious rights. Much of this has focused on domestic factors. 
For instance, Political regime matters for the protection of religious freedom. Democracies have 
political competition based on the multi-party system. Thus, repression of religious groups will 
face political retribution. However, the autocracies would not worry about the repercussion from 
religious restrictions. Democracy has a strong predictive power to explain the variation of religious 
repressions across wide range of countries (Wood 2008). Older democracies have fewer 
government restrictions on religious freedoms (Grim and Finke 2010), thus regime duration 
matters for religious restrictions. Even though most of the constitutions in the nations protect 
religious freedom, the majority of them also other laws restrict religions (Grim and Finke 2010). 
The gap between law and practice is widespread not only for all human rights protection, but also 
for religious freedom. An independent judiciary would help to bring legislative and administrative 
actions in line with constitutional assurances, by upholding the protection of religious freedom   
(Richardson 2004).  
Religious pluralism is an important factor influencing the degree of religious freedom in a 
society. Rulers grant religious liberties to the public based on their strategic considerations on their 
political and economic interests and the needs for political figures to balance competing interests 
in a religiously plural context are important driving forces for the religious liberty (Gill 2007). 
Religious pluralism is conducive to religious freedom, because it provides a market place for 
different religions to compete with each other for resources and motivate them to grow (Stark and 
Finke 2000; Gill 2007).  Thus, religious liberty is more likely to be in place when there is a diversity 
in religious market in a society.  
On the other hand, having a state religion is often related to religious repression. When 
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states establish one religion, other religions are necessarily in a disadvantaged place in a 
competition. Other religions could threaten the resources by challenging the dominant religion, the 
legitimacy of its institutions and the favored treatment it receives from the state or the society as a 
whole. In order to prevent unwanted competition and to secure more authority and resources, the 
dominant religion often seeks an alliance with the state. States often build their legitimacy off the 
established religion. Keeping the status of dominant religion is also in states’ interest to their rule.  
In order to secure and maintain this alliance, the state often restricts all other religions and 
discriminates against minority religions to keep the advantaged place the dominant religion holds.  
Scholars also find that religious restrictions in a society depend on the level of social 
tolerance of certain religions. Some religious groups can mobilize in support of a dominant religion 
or against selected sects and cults, thus they could sway the government to impose religious 
restrictions on some minority religious groups and individuals lacking cultural and social support 
with harsh administrative and legislative action(Grim and Finke 2010). Higher social divisions 
between religious groups also lead to religious repression, according Sarkissian’s cross national 
study (Sarkissian 2015). Religious freedom can intervene in this process and stop some religious 
groups from pressuring the government into restrictions on others.  
Current and former communist states often have higher levels of religious repression. 
Religions also serve as an unwanted competitor for secular states even absent an established 
religion. Current or former communist states often have the legacies of official secular ideologies 
and practices about which religions are approved and tolerated by the state. Even in former 
communist states, prior restrictions on religious practice may have become institutionalized and 
have attained a taken-for-granted quality (Breznau et al. 2011). Therefore, it is plausible that 
religious restrictions might be higher in the communist and former communist states.  
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Population size is positively also related to religious restrictions (Finke, Martin, and Fox 
2017) and stronger economies have fewer government restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010). 
Armed conflict byproduct of the larger conflicts (Grim and Finke 2010). The percentage of the 
religions in each country also matters. Percentage of Muslims relate to higher social restrictions, 
and higher percentages of Christianity are associated with lower levels of government 
restrictions on religion(Grim and Finke 2010). When religion and ethnicity are interwoven, a 
government’ restrictions of religious freedoms tend to increase. 
There has been very little work on how international factors affect religious rights 
outcomes. The international community has made great efforts to improve religious restrictions 
and discrimination just as any other human rights, but the effects of these efforts are 
understudied. International law, human rights activism, and globalization might all influence 
spiritual integrity rights practices just as they have been found to affect other human rights. 
Before getting into how these international forces affect religious rights, we need to first 
establish the different dimensions of religious rights practices – the individual and the group. 
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3 Two Dimensions of Religious Freedom  
– Groups and Individuals  
 
There has been an international norm that humans should be treated with dignity and 
respect, since the adoption of the International Bill of Human Rights. However, it has been 
controversial whether groups/organizations should be protected in the context of international 
human rights as well. The liberal tradition that originated in the western civilization argues that 
human rights should only be given to individuals, because the natural rights only apply to 
individuals. Therefore,  rights to dignity only belongs to individuals, and the protection of rights 
to groups is almost impossible to achieve (Donnelly 2013a). Some legal analysts (Scolnicov 
2010) also posed a question of protecting group rights: what if the groups infringe upon the 
individual rights? 
I argue that groups rights should not be denied only due to the technical difficulties of 
protecting both dimensions of rights, and both dimensions of human rights should be equally 
studied and protected. There are provisions in international law on the protection of religious 
groups, such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In fact, Asian philosophy 
and culture has historically promoted the rights to groups, and even argue that group rights 
sometimes come before the individual rights. In reality, a right can only be protected completely 
if both the group and individual dimensions are protected. In the case of religious rights and 
workers’ rights, the negligence of the group rights leads to the compromise of the individual 
rights. Theoretically, it hinders scholars to have a complete understanding of human rights and 
states’ motivations of restricting human right on both dimensions. This study makes a theoretical 
contribution arguing that there are two inherently different dimensions of human rights and we 
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should take both into account in future studies. 
The current scholarship in the scientific study of international human rights and religious 
freedom do not differentiate the individual and group dimensions of human rights (Hathaway 
2002; Hill 2010; Keith 1999; Lupu 2013; Grim and Finke 2010; Sarkissian 2015). Human beings 
do not only live as individuals, but also co-exist in a social setting. Therefore, Human rights are 
both individual and collective, and private and public. The expression of various rights often 
contains a collective dimension, which is often neglected. This study specifically examines the 
two dimensions of religious rights using religious restrictions index NX in Religion and State 
Data Round 2 (Fox 2015) and conducts exploratory factor analysis to explore the latent 
dimensions in the data. This study offers empirical evidence that states distinguish individual and 
group rights, and they treat the two different kinds of rights differently.  
3.1 Two Dimensions of Religious Freedom 
Even though there are still some controversies regarding whether international human 
rights regimes should protect both individual and group dimensions of human rights, there is a 
consensus that these two dimensions of human rights do exist. International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights has specific stipulations for states to protect the free expression of religious 
belief and the freedom to join religious associations.  
Donnelly argues that the protection of the universal human rights is only for individuals, 
because human rights only apply to individuals, and are based on the dignity of individuals. In 
the interactions between the rights-holders and duty bearers, the rights holders can only be 
human beings. Even though groups are comprised of human beings, but they are not human 
beings. He also argues that it is not realistic to protect group rights. For example, there might be 
difficulties in protecting women’s rights as a group, given women is a majority group (Donnelly 
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2013a).  
Admittedly, there might be some policy difficulties in the protection of group rights. 
However, it should not be the reason why group rights are not being acknowledged. In some 
cases, it is not possible to protect rights for individuals without the recognition and protection of 
group rights. For example, the denial of labor unions’ rights compromises workers’ individual 
rights, and the denial of rights to worship in churches is a denial of individual believers’ religious 
rights. For monotheistic religions (Abrahamic religions), acting on religious beliefs inherently 
includes practice both in private as individuals and in public with other fellow believers. 
Therefore, religious expression includes actions taken individually and collectively. The 
collective dimension of the free expression of religions can only be guaranteed by the legal 
existence of churches, schools and associations. The collective dimension of religion often 
intersects with other kinds civil and political rights, which makes the political authorities wary of 
its influence on their rule. For example, the group rights include whether religious individuals 
can go to religious schools to get educated with religious knowledge and form religious 
associations and political parties to influence public policy. The majority of the world’s 
population are the believers of Abrahamic religions (The Global Religious Landscape Report by 
Pew Research Center), which have provisions for believers to attend churches/congregations and 
engage in community activities. Denial of religious group rights prevents individuals from 
fulfilling their duty to the deity they believe in. Therefore, Individual and group religious rights 
are inseparable and equally important.  
Scolnicov also points out another potential flaw in international instruments protecting 
religious freedom. Because of the nature of religious freedom as both private and public, Scolnicov 
argues that the key to understanding religious human rights is the interpretation of the conflicts 
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between the group and individual rights in religious freedom. In the liberal tradition, individual 
religious rights emphasize an expression of their belief, and are the freedom of religion. However, 
the collective religious rights embody the communitarian aspect of religious rights and emphasize 
the group identity and the equality between religions (Scolnicov 2010). In this sense, religion is 
both a subject of liberty, such as freedom of speech, assembly and press, and also a subject of 
equality, which is protected by the laws. Scolnicov also asserts that group rights are derivatives of 
individual religious rights, thus individual rights always supersede the group rights. In this view 
the recognition of group rights results in inconsistent and unjustified determinations in religious 
freedom in international law. He also showed how this thesis is useful to understanding the 
conflicts between the individual rights of women and religious group rights; or the conflict 
between the individual rights of children and the group rights of family. Scolnicov also argues that 
groups might infringe upon the rights of individuals, even though he recognizes the individual and 
group dimensions of religious rights in his legal analysis.  For example, the religious rights of 
churches might infringe upon the rights of individuals. Congregations could abuse their power and 
punish people who want to leave the church, and family might infringe upon the rights of free 
choice of children or women (Scolnicov 2010).  
It is true that protection of group rights might lead to social restrictions of religious rights 
for individuals. However, not guaranteeing the groups rights is a denial of the religious rights for 
individuals in the first place, because group rights and individuals are interdependent and integral 
parts of religious freedom. In fact, these two dimensions of religious rights are both recognized by 
international human rights regimes, despite of the potential conflicts between the two dimensions. 
Religious freedom for groups is protected in Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UHDR) 
(Durham, Facilitating Freedom of religion or belief). Article 18 in UHDR states – “everyone has 
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the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,….alone or in community with others and 
in public or private…” – and the same principle is reiterated in International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Religious freedom is not only personal but also social. It is a 
personal right, because religion is a core element of an individual’s belief system and often defines 
individuals’ identities. This individual dimension of religious freedom is related to the expressive 
needs of religious individuals, and the group dimension acknowledges an individual's group 
identities and connections to faith communities. 
Even though the social dimension of religious rights can conceivably infringe upon 
individuals’ practice of religion, both dimensions of the religious right are being highly regulated 
and restricted all over the world. States might have different emphases on their policy and 
practice in religious restrictions. Restrictions on one dimension can lead to the restrictions on 
another due to the fact that two dimensions of religious rights are interdependent. Accounting for 
the two dimensions of religious freedom is important to the development of empirical work and 
theory building.  For example, States might have different motivations or considerations to 
regulate the individual expressions of religion and the collective/communitarian activities of 
religion. The social and collective aspect of religion is what concerns states the most (Chapter 3 
by Hehir, Abrams 2002). Therefore, states might be motivated to regulate the two aspects of 
religious rights differently based on the different natures of these two dimensions of religious 
rights. This dynamic might also be influenced by some domestic factors such as the regime type, 
and international factors such as globalization, commitments on human rights, and the presence 
of human right organizations. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H: There are two distinct dimensions of religious restrictions: individual and group.  
I will then analyze the government religious restriction data in Religion and State Round 
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2 (RAS2) and examine the two latent dimensions of religious restrictions and discuss the 
distinctive natures of religious individual and group rights. 
3.2 Data and Methods 
3.2.1 Data 
The main data source for the exploratory factor analysis is the NX index on religious 
restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) dataset (Fox 2015). The RAS2 dataset 
uses detailed indicators to measure Regulation of and Restrictions on the Majority Religion and 
All Religions (NX) and each indicator ranges from 0 (no restrictions) to 3 (large scales of 
restrictions), and it comprehensively covers government religious restrictions in various 
dimensions ( Fox 2015, 267).  Factor analysis in this study is run on 20 indicators in this data set. 
This dataset is an ideal one to explore whether there are two dimensions in the comprehensive 
data. Even though this dataset has been updated to the year 2014, this study uses the old version, 
because of the years (1990-2003) covered in the following empirical chapters in my dissertation 
study.  
Religious freedom has been measured by states’ violation of religious freedom norms by 
different researchers, such as the RAS2 dataset by Jonathon Fox, Government Restrictions Index 
(GRI) by Pew research center, CIRI Human Rights Dataset by David Richards and Chad Clay, 
and IRF dataset by Brian Grim and Roger Fink. I choose RAS2 dataset in this study because the 
NX index (religious restrictions on all religions) in RAS2 (Fox 2015) has the most detailed 29 
indicators on various types of religious restrictions on groups and individuals. This feature is 
important for this study centering on the theoretical difference between individual and group 
dimensions of religious rights. 
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Even though this study only covers the years from 1990 to 2003, the newest version of 
RAS project has updated the data to the RAS round 3 covering the year from 1990 to 2014. Due 
to the limitation of the data on two main independent variables – HROs and direct targeting 
events - in my dissertation project, the data has been truncated to include the years from 1990 to 
2003 after a list-wise deletion. Future studies can collect more data covering years after 2003 and 
conduct analyses to improve the external validity of this study.  
3.2.2 Statistical Method: Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a multivariate analysis which deals with the internal structure of matrices 
of covariances and correlations. The indicators measuring certain concepts may be clustered based 
on their inter-correlations, and each cluster reflects a dimension which causes the associations 
within the set of the variables. With the Religion and State Round 2 data, the factors which emerge 
within the matrices of covariances and correlations summarize the major components of the 
variation among the variables. 
The first step I conducted in the factor analysis was to construct a correlation matrix of the 
NX index. I selected the principle-component technique over competing methods on the ground 
that it yields a mathematically unique solution in which the first factor accounts for the maximum 
amount of variance within the data, while each succeeding factor extracts the maximum of the 
remaining unexplained variance.  I decided to extract two factors with the standard that all factors 
have an eigenvalue of >=1. Factors with an eigenvalue of 1 account for as much variance as a 
single variable. I also generated a scree plot, and it shows that 2 factors are appropriate, because 2 
is where the slope of the curve is clearly leveling off.  In order to identify the most invariant factor 
structure, I rotated the principal-factor solution. The factors were rotated to an orthogonal and to 
an oblique solution. The factors generated from “orthogonal” rotation are not correlated, while 
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factors from “oblique” have the minimal correlations. The orthogonal solution best fulfilled the 
simple structure criteria and was selected for presentation (Costello and Osborne n.d.). However, 
the factor loadings from both rotations are generated and included in the Table 1.  
Even though there are multiple methods available to extract the factor scores, I adopted the 
least squares regression approach to estimate factor score. In comparison to other refined methods 
such as the Barlett and Anderson & Rubin factor scores, the regression scores have the highest 
validity, which means that the factor score extracted have the highest correlations to the factors 
(DiStefano, Zhu, and Mîndril n.d.). Factors scores are standard scores with a mean as 0, and 
variance as the squared multiple correlation between indicators and factor. 
In the discussion that follows, I first present the factor loadings observed variables have on 
each factor, and then interpret the factors descriptively and consider what basic dimensions might 
be inferred. It is also necessary to examine the validity of the factors. Even though no comparable 
study or data on the two dimensions of religious freedom has been completed, I conducted 
correlation analysis between the two factors generated from the factor analysis and the indicators 
from the simple additive methods.  
3.2.3 Model 
The statistical model used to estimate the factor scores is followed: 
?̂?1m= 𝑍1n𝐵𝑛m 
𝐵𝑛m =  𝑅𝑛m
−1 𝐴𝑛m 
Where: 
n is the number of observed variables/indicators;  
m is the number of factors; 
?̂?is the row vector of m estimated factor scores; 
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Z is the row vector of n standardized observed variables/indicators; 
B is the matrix regression of weights for the m factors on the n observed variables; 
 𝑅−1 is the inverse of the matrix of correlations between the n observed variables; 
 𝐴′ is a pattern matrix of loadings of 20 observed variables on 2 factors.  
3.3 Model Results 
The findings of exploratory factor analysis indicate that religious restrictions measured by 
the data do not occur randomly from one polity to the next; they occur in highly associated patterns 
or dimensions. In other words, basic dimensions do underlie the complex religious restriction 
behaviors by the states. The chi square statistic is 5809.82 on 169 degrees of freedom. The 
hypothesis that two factors are sufficient is supported by the fact that the p-value is 0. The two 
factors account for 63 per cent of the total variance in the 20 observed variables, and it supports 
strong inferences. Most of the observed variables load relatively high on one of factors, and only 
5 loaded lower than +- 0.50 by one factor. For those observed variables that have lower loadings, 
the gap between the loadings is larger than 0.3 in general. Hence, the solution employed yields 
mutually independent factors.  
Even though the empirical chapters that follow use the factor scores from orthogonal 
rotation with a minimal correlation between the two factors, the factor loadings from both 
rotational methods are included in Table 1 and two methods indicate a stable pattern for the 
underlying dimensions. The first factor has high loadings mostly on items focusing on whether 
any level of government imposes limitations on religious organizations, such as churches, schools 
and associations. For example, items regarding government restrictions on religious parties, 
government restrictions on religious members and organizations not sponsored by the states, and 
government restrictions on religious clergy and/or organizations engaging in public political 
                                                                                   46 
 
 
speech all have high loadings on factor 1. I labeled this factor as “Organization restrictions” 
(𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑔). This conclusion is further substantiated when I examine the rank order of the countries 
on the factor.  
The second factor has high loadings on items concerned with the government restrictions 
on individuals’ expression and practice of their religions, such as public observance of religious 
practices, public religious speech, and access to places of worship. For instance, items regarding 
restrictions on the public observance of religious practices, restrictions on access to places of 
worship, whether people are arrested for religious activities are all have high loadings on factor 2. 
Thus, the second factor is focused on the religious restrictions on individual practice of religion 
and is labeled as “individual restrictions” (𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑). This conclusion is further substantiated when 
I examine the rank order of the countries on the factor.  
I also conducted a validity test to compare the factor scores from the refined regression 
method with those from simple additive methods. The correlation tests results indicate that the 
correlation between additive measure and factor measure for religious organizations is 0.89, and 
the correlation for religious individuals is 0.53. In general, there is a relatively high correlation 
between scores from different kinds of methods. The factor measures are more refined than the 
additive methods, because they take account of the different correlations each observed variables 
have with the factors and other observed variables.  
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Table 3.1 The Factor Analysis Loadings for Government Religious Restrictions (NX) Index 
 
 Indicators of Religious Restrictions 
 Factor Loadings 
(Orthogonal 
Rotation) 
 Factor Loadings 
(Oblique 
Rotation) 
   GRRorg  GRRind  GRRorg  GRRind 
 Restrictions on religious political parties.  0.501  -0.109 
 
    0.358  
  
 -0.080 
 The government restricts or harasses 
religious members and organizations 
not sponsored by the states 
 0.827  -0.079  0.799    -0.172 
 Restrictions on formal religious 
organizations other than political 
parties.  
 0.523  0.310  0.472     0.321 
 Restrictions on the public observance of 
religious practices 
 -0.088  0.786  -0.132     0.874 
 Restrictions on religious activities outside of 
recognized religious facilities. 
 -0.088  0.786  -0.073     0.811 
 Restrictions on public religious speech.   0.365  0.460  0.408     0.445 
 Restrictions or monitoring of sermons by 
clergy.  
 0.847  -0.131 
 
    0.742 
  
 -0.044 
 Restrictions on clergy and/or religious 
organizations engaging in public 
political speech or on political activity 
in or by religious institutions. 
 0.503  -0.054  0.432     0.028 
 Restrictions on access to places of worship.   0.187  0.626  0.090     0.684 
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 Restrictions on the publication or 
dissemination of written religious 
material. 
 0.400  0.534  0.343     0.508 
 People are arrested for religious activities.  -0.115  0.956  -0.109     0.933 
 Restrictions on religious public gatherings 
that are not placed on other types of 
public gathering. 
 -0.132  0.783  0.036     0.485 
 Restrictions on or regulation of religious 
education in public schools. 
 0.574  -0.249  0.697    -0.267 
 Restrictions on or regulation of religious 
education outside of public schools or 
general government control of religious 
education. 
 0.552  0.233  0.698     0.055 
 The government appoints or must approve 
clerical appointments or somehow 
takes part in the  appointment process. 
  appointment process.   
 0.540  0.132 0.513  0.149 
The government legislates or officially 
influences the internal workings or 
organization of religious institutions 
and organizations. 
 
 
  
  
  institutions and organizations.   
 0.573  0.058  0.677     0.003 
 Laws governing the state religion are passed 
by the government or need the 
government’s approval before being 
put into effect.  
 0.320  -0.096  0.641     0.015 
 State ownership of some religious property 
or buildings.  
 0.392  0.046  0.458    -0.053 
Co c entious objectors to military service 
are not given other options for national 
service and are   prosecuted.  
 0.408  0.009  0.603    -0.180 
 Other religious restrictions.  0.409  -0.110  0.270     0.004 
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3.4 Descriptive Exploration of the Two Factors 
Because the orthogonal rotation fits more with the simple structure in the data and have the 
minimal correlations between the two factors, I mainly discuss the factors from orthogonal rotation 
in the following. The factors have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The correlation between 
𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑔 and 𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑 is 0.09 (p<0.05).  
With the deepening of globalization in the past decades, and the efforts made by the 
international community to protect human rights, it is imperative to know whether the average 
level of religious freedom is increasing or reducing. I created a figure which pictures the average 
level of religious restrictions across all countries from 1990 to 2003. As indicated in Figure 1, the 
longitudinal trends of the two factors are consistent. The mean levels of organizational and 
individual religious restrictions have increased. From 1990 to 1992, the individual religious rights 
were higher than the organizational religious rights, which might be the delayed effect of the 
communist rule of the Eastern European countries. After 1992, the levels of religious individual 
and organizational religious rights have been simultaneously rising up, and the gap between them 
has been changing too. From 1996 to 1999, the mean religious organizational restriction level is 
higher than the mean religious individual restrictions. There was a drop of the religious 
organizational restriction from the year of 1999 to 2000, however, it has been increasing since 
2000. There was a drop of mean religious individual restrictions level from the year of 2002 to 
2003, while the mean religious restriction level for organizations continued to increase.  
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Figure 3.1 Mean Religious Organizational and Individual Rights 1990-2003 
 
Extant literature on religious freedom has indicated that the level of religious restrictions 
varies by regime types; democracies have lower level of religious freedom than autocracies (Grim 
and Finke 2008). Therefore, it would be helpful to see whether there are any regional or national 
difference in the degree of religious freedom across countries. Geographically, there are some 
interesting patterns too in terms of the mean levels of the religious restrictions for organizations as 
indicated in Figure 2. The restrictions for religious organizations are widespread all over the world, 
and there are relatively big variations across countries. The highest level seems to be in Middle 
East and North Africa. Countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria have noticeably 
high scores on this factor, which indicates that Middle Eastern countries tend to impose higher 
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religious restrictions on organizations than other countries. This could be explained by application 
of Islamic law in such countries, which puts restrictions on religious groups, and also how 
theocratic regimes control religions in general. China, Russia, certain European, African and South 
American Countries have a medium level of religious restrictions for organizations. The rest of 
the regions/countries such as North America have a relatively low level of religious restrictions 
for organizations.  
 
Figure 3.2 Global Mean Organizational Religious Restrictions 
 
The geographical pattern for religious individual rights is different. The restrictions for 
religious individuals are also widespread but have less variation from 1990 to 2003. Some 
countries have a higher level religious individual restrictions rights than the rest of regions or 
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countries. For example, it seems that North Korea, China, Central Asian countries, and Eastern 
European countries have a higher level of religious restrictions on individuals in terms of the 
individual expression of religious beliefs and practices than other countries or regions. It might be 
due to the political regimes in these countries are controlled by communist parties. This could also 
be explained by the legacy of the totalitarian regimes from the post-communist states that 
controlled all aspects of social life. The rest of regions/countries have some level of variations, but 
the differences are not particularly big. 
 
Figure 3.3 Global Mean Individual Religious Restrictions 
 
3.5 Conclusions and Implications  
A controversy in the international human rights is whether human rights include the rights 
to groups. Scholars, advocates and legal experts are divided in this debate. Even though the 
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mainstream scholarship in the scientific study of international human rights has argued for the 
individual dimension of human rights, and largely neglected the group dimension of human rights, 
I argue that a complete understanding of international human rights can be developed if both 
individual and group dimensions of human rights are taken into account in scholarly works. 
Theoretically, group and individual rights are different, because the entities hold the rights are 
different: organizations and individuals respectively. In the discussion of the relationship between 
states and human rights, this distinction between groups and individuals is especially critical for 
us to understand states’ behavior toward human rights protection. Due to the inherently different 
nature of human rights to groups and individuals, states might treat groups and individuals 
differently. Groups are social entities in the public, and also easier to be mobilized and organized. 
Therefore, this property is likely to arouse states’ suspicion toward them. States might also feel 
more threatened by groups. In contrast, individuals are private and harder to be organized, so states 
might perceive individuals are less of a threat.  
This study offers empirical evidence that states treat religious individuals and groups 
differently from the exploratory factor analysis, which points a new direction in the study of 
international human rights. The scholarship in human rights needs to take account of both group 
and individual dimensions to further develop theories and empirical evidence.  
Scholars can test the effects of the conditions of two dimensions of human rights on some 
important factors in international relations. Due to the different natures of these dimensions of 
human rights, they might have different effects on other aspects of the society. For example, how 
do the protection of the two different sets of rights influence the protection of other kinds of human 
rights? How do the conditions of these two dimensions of human rights influence the economic 
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development? And would the two dimensions of rights have influence on the level of democracy 
in a cross-national setting? 
Scholars can also test how the common factors, which have been proven to influence the 
protection of human rights, might impact the protection of the two dimensions of human rights 
differently. Some important domestic factors, such as democracy, economic growth rate, 
population, internal wars and conflicts, might condition how states treat groups and individuals 
differently. In addition, the international environment also matters. The world has become more 
globalized in the past a few decades.  Is globalization influencing how states treat their citizens as 
individuals and groups? Under the international legal commitments in human rights protection, 
states might make some adjustments in policy and practice. But would they treat individuals and 
group differently under the legal commitments? More efforts in human rights protection have been 
made by transnational activism networks on a grass roots level. Under the pressure of the domestic 
presence of the HROs and the naming and shaming campaigns, states might be forced to treat their 
citizens better. Would states genuinely modify their behavior in human rights protection toward 
groups and individuals? 
This study also has policy implications for the better protection of religious freedom and 
international human rights. A better recognition that states do treat individuals and groups 
differently is the first step leading to a better protection of human rights, because either groups or 
individuals should not be neglected in the agenda of international human rights protection. With a 
better understanding of the dynamic interactions between states and the citizens as groups and 
individuals, we are able gain more insights on whether states treat individuals and groups different 
in different domestic and international contexts. Therefore, the international community can make 
more targeted efforts to pressure the governments to treat groups and individuals better.  
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4 The Divergent Effects of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights on the Protection of Religious Freedom  
 
The surprising resurgence of religion since the late twentieth century has been 
accompanied by its rising influence in political, economic and cultural aspects of the world (Toft, 
Philpott, and Shah 2011). However, governmental and social restrictions on religion are also 
prevalent in this globalized world. Efforts in the protection of religious freedom have been made 
in international arenas. International law has been considered an important instrument to constrain 
governments, groups, and individuals to better protect religious freedom. 
International legal norms in religious freedom have been forming based on the UN 
Declarations, ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and regional 
instruments, but the ICCPR is the only international law protecting religious freedom.  So far 167 
countries have ratified the ICCPR, which is meant to improve the civil and political rights in these 
countries. However, religious restrictions and persecution are still widespread and even on the rise 
in recent years, according to human rights NGOs’ reports and governments’ (Pew Research Center 
Report 2018).  
This chapter tests whether the ratification of ICCPR restrains states’ behavior in religious 
freedom. As a key contribution of this chapter, I examine how ratification of the international law 
in human rights affects states behavior on these two levels of religious freedom with different 
mechanisms. The results of statistical models indicate that the duration of ratification of ICCPR 
has a positive effect on the protection of religious freedom for organizations such as churches and 
schools, but ratification of ICCPR worsens the protection of religious rights for individuals. 
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My fixed effect models take account of the heterogeneity of country level characteristics 
and global time trends and estimate the effect of ratification of ICCPR on states’ behavior 
controlling a broad series of control variables based on the extant literature in international law 
and human rights protection. The data used in this study comes from a panel dataset covering 118 
countries across 14 years, and the dependent variables - religious restrictions for individuals and 
organizations - are from the RAS2 (Religion and State) dataset, which is the most comprehensive 
dataset capturing the different dimensions of religious restriction practice by the governments 
(Sarkissian 2015). I will review the literature first, then conduct quantitative analyses with fixed 
effect models to test my hypotheses. 
4.1 Effect of Human Rights Treaty on Rights Protection     
The early research on the effect of international law on human rights practice is rather 
pessimistic; the effect is either non-existent or negative (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui 2007). Some argue that the human rights treaty failed because of the weak 
implementation mechanism and relying too much on the goodwill of the party states (Keith 1999, 
Neumayer 2005). Thus, repressive states can get away with human rights violations with low costs 
after the ratification of human rights treaties. Others argue that states sometimes ratify treaties to 
avoid criticism associated with remaining outside of the regime, but they do not really comply 
with international law in action, since it was an insincere ratification in the first place. Thus, the 
compliance often can be replaced by position taking in an international community (Hathaway 
2002). Other scholars argue that authoritarian countries actually use the signing of the treaties to  
signal to  opposition groups domestically that they will remain in power by repressive actions, thus 
treaty ratification is used to prolong the tenure of autocratic leaders and attract foreign aid (Hollyer 
and Rosendorff 2011). However, it is still quite perplexing why the effects of human rights 
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sometimes are negative if not zero.  
More recent works have recognized the weaknesses in the early works’ methods and 
theories and updated our understandings of the effect of human rights treaties. After accounting 
for selection effects methodologically in their studies,  scholars find that states with better human 
rights practices tend to ratify more human rights treaties (Von Stein 2005), so the relationship 
between treaty and human rights practice can be positive and more nuanced (Landman 2004, 
Landman 2005, Hill 2010, Neumayer 2005). Data inflation is another problem in human rights 
study. After accounting for the increased accountability by  INGOs human rights reports in recent 
years, due to increased information, better data collecting methods and enhanced human rights 
standards, a new study reveals that ratification is  positively related to the human rights protections 
(Fariss 2017).  
In addition, states’ compliance with international law is constrained by domestic political 
conditions, such as the presence of democratic institutions (Landman 2005), bureaucratic 
efficiency (Cole 2015),  information in judicial enforcement (Lupu 2013), and effectiveness of 
their domestic legal systems (Powell and Staton 2009). Thus, it is not necessarily the states’ 
willingness to comply with human rights treaties to some extent, but their capacities preventing 
them from following through on commitments. 
Ratification of human rights treaties can also improve human rights due to domestic 
mobilization of civil society. Human rights treaties can empower individuals, groups, or parts of 
the state with different rights preferences and change domestic politics of states by altering the 
political calculations of domestic actors. Ratified treaties can influence legislative agendas of 
governing elites, inspire and facilitate litigation, and provide resources and galvanize social 
mobilization (Simmons 2009a). Even if states ratify treaties insincerely, NGOs can socialize  
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domestic activists to petition the UN and publicly shame the government, leading to compliance 
under  internal and external pressures (Heather 2012, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) 
Because the effect of human rights treaties can be different based on different rights (Hill 
2010, Lupu 2013), it is necessary to examine effect of ICCPR on religious freedom as a less 
explored civil right. One study finds that ICCPR does improve the protection of religious freedom 
(Lupu 2013), but it does not differentiate the two dimensions of religious rights. Thus, it is still not 
clear whether ICCPR is effective on both religious individuals and groups. The data used in Lupu’s 
(2013) study also did not differentiate religious restrictions and religious discrimination, so the 
results indicate the mixed effect of ICCPR on religious majority groups and minority groups. 
Religious restrictions on majority religions are qualitatively different from discrimination against 
particular minority religions. Religious restrictions on all religions capture states’ fear, hatred, and 
suspicion of religion in general rather than discriminatory attitudes towards minority religions (Fox 
2015). Therefore, this study will explore the effect of international law on religious restrictions 
overall rather than discriminations against particular religions.  
4.2 ICCPR and the Protection of Two Dimensions of Religious Rights 
Religious freedom inherently includes group and individual rights (Scolnicov 2010). Thus, 
it would not be appropriate to assume that these two kinds of rights are affected by international 
law equally. Different mechanisms might take effect after the ratification of ICPPR on the two 
dimensions of religious freedom. To better understand the influence of international law (ICCPR) 
on the protection of religious freedom, it is necessary to look at the key latent dimensions of 
religious freedom underlying the data and the impact of the international law on the two 
dimensions. In consistent with Scolnicov (2010)’s theory, I find that there are two latent 
dimensions in Fox’s religious restriction index (RAS 2) (Fox 2015), and religious restrictions are 
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indeed operating on individual and  organizational levels based on exploratory factor analysis. The 
more detailed analysis will be discussed later in this paper.  
Why would international law influence the protection of these two kinds of religious rights 
differently? Religious individual rights and group rights are qualitatively different; religious 
individual rights have an emphasis on the expression of one’s belief, while the group rights are 
more about the group identity (Scolnicov 2010). Religious groups have a social, communitarian 
dimension (Scolnicov 2010),. Therefore, religious groups enjoy a higher visibility to the public, 
media, HROs and third-party states in comparison to the individuals. Restrictions on the religious 
group rights are easier to be exposed and reported by the media and HROs. For example, the 
favoritism of the orthodox church by Russian government is highly visible, but the persecution of 
the religious minorities is less visible. Additionally, the demolition of the churches, the arrest of 
the religious leaders, and governmental appointments of clergy in churches and religious 
organizations are frequently reported by media and HROs, but the reports on the persecution of 
the individual religious believers are rare. In fact, the persecution of religious individuals, like the 
Baha’is in Iran and Yemen and Shias in Saudi Arabia, is widespread. If states’ violations of human 
rights are more visibly reported by the media and human rights organizations, they cannot use the 
ratification of human rights laws as an expressive instrument to maintain a better standing and 
reputation on the international stage (Hathaway 2002). Therefore, states are under more pressure 
from HROs and third-party countries to lessen the regulations on religious organizations after they 
ratify human rights treaties. 
States pay less costs to improve group rights in practice. Information in domestic judicial 
enforcement matters for the implementation of the human rights treaties (Lupu 2013). Violations 
of the collective religious rights are easier to detect, and evidence is easier to gather because the 
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violations of religious group rights are in the public. In contrast, individual rights violations are 
harder to detect or collect, and states often deny such behaviors. For example, demolition of 
churches is easy to notice, while limitations on individual religious practice are harder to observe. 
In addition, religious groups represent organized interests and have more resources and influences, 
while individuals, plagued by collective actions problems, are less equipped to defend their rights. 
On the other hand, states may want to protect human rights, but the “principal-agent” 
problem may cause different level of human rights enforcement for group rights and individual 
rights (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014, Englehart 2009).The central 
governments may sincerely want to improve religious freedom after ratifying the human rights 
treaty, but they might not be able to control what their agents – local governments and police - do, 
especially when central governments are weak or failing. Therefore, central governments may be 
better able to enforce “organizational rights” standards than “individual rights” standards, as the 
latter are more likely to be violated at the local level by state agents acting in their own self-interest 
as opposed to the interests of central government.  
Thus, states tend to improve their practice in religious freedom for groups due to the 
external pressures, lower costs and better visibility. I hypothesize that: 
H1: States lower their restrictions on organizations’ religious freedom after ratifying 
ICCPR; the effect grows with time.  
In contrast, because religious individuals are relatively less visible on the internationals 
stage, evidence of violations is harder to collect, so states are held less accountable for restricting 
individual religious rights. For autocracies, states often  tighten their control of human rights after 
ratifying treaties to send signals to opposition forces that they still hold the power despite treaty 
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ratification (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Hawkins and Goodliffe 2006). Therefore, if states have 
made improvements and compromises on the organization level of religious freedom under 
external pressures, they might in the meantime tighten their control of religious freedom for 
individuals to maintain their general control of religions. In addition, individuals in societies suffer 
from collective action problems and are not able to defend their interests collectively even if they 
have legal ground to change the states’ behavior after the ratification of international law in human 
rights. I hypothesize that: 
H2: States tighten their restrictions on individuals’ religious freedom after ratifying 
ICCPR; the effect grows with time.  
This study examines not only the effect of ICCPR, but also the Optional Protocol 1 to the 
ICCPR. Even though ICCPR has a weak implementation mechanism (Keith 1999), Optional 
Protocol 1 allows individuals to petition UN Human Rights Committee on the account of the 
violations of any the rights set forth in the Covenant to strengthen the enforcement mechanism of 
the ICCPR. After the Committee receives the communications from individuals on the account of 
the abuse of their rights, the committee will bring the communication to the attention of the State 
Party, and the State Party is required to submit a written explanation to clarify the matter and 
remedy may have been taken by that Sate. These complaints from individuals will also be included 
in the annual reports of that State by the Committee under article 45 of the Covenant (United 
Nation Treaty Collection). Therefore, Optional Protocol 1 strengthens the effect of ICCPR on the 
protection of individual rights by an enhanced enforcement mechanism through naming and 
shaming Party States.  
H3: States improve their restrictions on individuals’ religious freedom after ratifying the 
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Optional 1 Protocol to ICCPR. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1  Data  
By aggregating the independent and control variables needed in this research, I have 
created a panel dataset. After performing list-wise deletion, the data includes 118 entities 
(countries) across 14 years from 1990 to 2003 (the time spans are shorter for some countries due 
to lack of data). The dependent variables tested are the religious restrictions on organizations 
(𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑔) and religious restrictions on individuals (𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑). Those two variables are two factors 
derived from the index on religious restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) 
dataset (Fox 2015) based on the factor analysis in Chapter 3.  
The main independent variable is the ratification of ICCPR1. The ICCPR is the only 
treaty that protects religious freedom and upholds the values in UDHR regarding religious 
freedom. Data on the ratification by country and year is collected from the United Nations Treaty 
Collection website. I operationalized ratification of ICCPR as a continuous variable ( 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ) , which is measured by the years after ratification of ICCPR or the duration 
of ICCPR has been in effect. I also included a dummy variable (Ratification), which is coded as 
1 when states have ratified ICCPR, otherwise it is coded as 0, as a control variable. It is 
important to include this continuous measure of ICCPR, because the dummy variable does not 
take into account of the fact that states usually take some time to adopt the norms of human 
 
 
1 I also intended to include a measurement of reservation of article 18 of ICCPR, which could also influence the 
states’ legal commitment of ICCPR. However, there are only five states have a reservation regarding article 18: Laos, Maldives, 
Mauritania, Mexico and Qatar, and only Mexico is included due to the availability of data. Therefore, I was not able estimate 
the effect of reservation of ICCPR on religious freedom.  
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rights and eventually change their behavior in human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 
173 (73.5%) countries are the parties to this treaty so far and 118 countries are included in this 
study based on the availability of data. There are more western democracies and former U.S.S.R 
countries that have ratified ICCPR than countries from other regions. Asian and Middle Eastern 
and North African countries have ratified it the least, and Sub-Saharan countries and Latin 
American lie in the middle.  
Another independent variable is the ratification of the Optional 1 Protocol to ICCPR 
(𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙1), which takes into consideration of the level of legal commitment 
regarding ICCPR. It is a dummy variable. I coded the measure of 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙1 as 1 if 
states have ratified it, otherwise as 0.  
To follow the line of research in human rights protection, I will control for the following 
variables in my models.  The level of economic development is positively related to states’ respect 
for human rights according to past research (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; 
Рое, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009). Specifically, stronger economies have 
fewer government religious restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010). However, the effects of economic 
growth are mixed. Economic growth can expand the resource base and reduce the economic and 
social stress, so the governments are less likely to use repression. On the other hand, rapid 
economic growth also can increase instability which induce the states to resort to coercion (Poe 
and Tate 1994a). In this study, economic development is measured by the GDP and economic 
growth is measured by percentage growth in GDP.  
Population size is positively related to repression according to studies (Poe and Tate 
1994; Рое, Tate, and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 
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2001). Population size is also positively related to religious restrictions  (Finke, Martin, and Fox 
2017).  To operationalize the effects of population on the abuse of human rights through 
repression, I will use the total national population to measure the population size. The data for 
the population size for the 167 countries are from the World Bank development indicators.   
The type of political regime also matters for religious freedom. Most of the research in the 
areas of international human rights law also find that democracy is positively correlated with better 
practice in human rights law compliance with different approaches (Poe and Tate 1994; Рое, Tate, 
and Keith 1999; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001, Hathaway 2002, 
Dai 2005). Non-democratic countries repress religion more than others (Grim and Finke 2010; 
Sarkissian 2015; Finke and Martin 2014). Democracies have political competition based on the 
multi-party system. Thus, repression of religions will face political retribution. In this study the 
democracy variable is measured by the Polity IV score created by Center for Systemic Peace. It 
ranges from -10 to +10 measuring the autocratic political system to democratic political system.  
Judicial independence is also an important control variable. I adopt the measure provided 
by CIRI Human Rights Data Project. The levels of judicial independence across countries are 
coded as 0 for “not independent”, 1 for “partially independent” and 2 for “generally 
independent”. 
Regime duration matters for religious freedom too. Older democracies have fewer 
government restrictions on religious freedoms (Grim and Finke 2010), thus regime duration 
matters for religious restrictions. Newer regimes and well-established regimes may also have 
different tendencies to respect human rights ( Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; 
Hathaway 2005) This variable is measured by the regime durability in Polity IV data.  
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Scholars have also found that internal and external conflicts in countries are often related 
to the regimes’ lower respect for human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Рое, Tate, and Keith 1999; 
Rasler 1986). The data for internal conflicts and external conflicts are from the Major Episodes 
of Political Violence and Conflict Regions, 1946-2015, by the Center for Systemic Peace. 
International conflicts are measured by the number of international violence and wars the states 
have participated in; the internal conflicts are measured by the amount of the civil violence, civil 
war, ethnic violence and ethic war the states experienced.  
States’ integration into international social society is also an important factor. Global 
economic interdependence is also important factor influencing human rights protection in 
countries (Hathaway 2002,  Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). This variable is measured by the 
percentage of gross domestic product made up by trade, and the source of the data is from World 
Development Indicators.  
Studies find that percentage of the Muslims in a country is positively related to religious 
restrictions (Finke and Martin 2014), while the percentage of Christians is negatively related to 
religious restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010). I included two variables measuring percentages of 
Muslims and Christians, which are provided in World Religion Data by the Correlates of War 
Project.  
Religious diversity is an important factor influencing the degree of religious freedom in a 
society. Rulers grant religious liberties to the public based on their strategic considerations on their 
political and economic interests. The needs for political figures to balance competing interests in 
a religiously plural context are important driving forces for the religious liberty (Gill 2007). 
Religious pluralism is conducive to religious freedom, because it provides a market place for 
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different religions to compete with each other for resources and motivate them to grow (Stark and 
Finke 2000; Gill 2007).  Thus, religious liberty is more likely to be in place where there is religious 
diversity. I created a measure of religious diversity using the data of percentages of different 
religious groups by World Religion Data through the method of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
measure. It is a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1.  
Having an official state religion is often related to religious repression. When states 
establish one religion, other religions are in a disadvantaged place. In order to prevent unwanted 
competition and secure more authority and resources, the dominant religion often seeks an alliance 
with the state. On the other hand, states often build their legitimacy off the established religion. 
Keeping the status of dominant religion is also in regimes’ interest to their rule.  In order to secure 
and maintain this alliance, the state often restricts all other religions and discriminates against 
minority religions to keep the advantaged place the dominant religion (s) holds. I include a measure 
for religious establishment – Official Religion, which is from the Religion and State data by 
Jonathan Fox. I recoded this variable into a dummy variable; 1 means the state has established 
religions, while 0 means the state has no official religions. 
The basic data statistics of the above variables are in the table 4.1 below.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Models 
 
Statistic N Mean St.Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
 
GRRorg 1,494 0.0 1.0 -1.4 -0.5 -0.03 4.0 
GRRind 1,494 0.0 1.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 8.2 
Ratification 1,494 0.9 0.4 0 1 1 1 
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Ratificationyear 1,494 14.0 9.7 0 5 22 36 
Ratificationoptional1 1,494 0.6 0.5 0 0 1 1 
Judiciary Independence 1,494 1.2 0.7 0 1 2 2 
POLITY2 1,494 3.8 6.3 -10 -2 9 10 
Log(population) 1,494 16.2 1.5 11.2 15.3 17.1 20.8 
Log(GDP) 1,494 23.7 2.2 18.9 22.1 25.4 30.1 
GDPgrowth 1,494 3.2 5.3 -50.2 1.6 5.6 35.2 
Trade (%GDP) 1,494 71.4 38.1 11.1 46.3 85.7 280.4 
Internal war 1,494 0.7 1.6 0 0 0 10 
External war 1,494 0.03 0.3 0 0 0 4 
Regime Duration 1,494 22.4 31.2 0 4 30 194 
Islam (%) 1,494 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.002 0.3 1.0 
Christian (%) 1,494 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.9 1.0 
Religious Diversity 1,494 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
Religious Establishment 1,494 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 1 
        
 
4.3.2 Statistical Modeling 
Because of the considerable heterogeneity among the countries examined in this study as 
panel data, the pooled OLS models may not be proper methods to estimate the effects of the 
independent variable on religious restrictions. This study uses fixed effect models to examine the 
“within” effect of the ratification of ICCPR in countries, taking account of both the heterogeneity 
across countries and years. The estimates of this study should reveal whether states change 
behavior in religious freedom after they ratify the treaty within the time frame in this study. I will 
test the following models: 
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Fixed Effect Models: GRRorg/GRRind = (𝑖+𝑡) + β1Ratificationyear +
β2Ratification + β3Ratificationoptional1 + 𝛽4 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
In this model, 𝑖 is the individual effect and 𝑡 is the time effect. 𝑖 captures the effects 
that are specific to some countries but constant over time, whereas 𝑡 captures effects that are 
specific to some time period but constant over countries. Controlling for time effect is necessary. 
First, important international events such as the end of Cold War and the deepening of 
globalization happened after 1990. Also, there is an increasing trend in the past decades that human 
rights data are inflated due to the higher of accountability and better data collection methods (Fariss 
2017). Taking account of fixed effect of years helps alleviate this problem.  𝑖𝑡 is the error term in 
this model.  𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of control variables including political regime, judiciary independence, 
population, GDP size, GDP growth rate, the proportion of trade in GDP, internal war and external 
war and regime duration.  
4.4  Findings 
The effect of the duration of the ratification of ICCPR on religious restrictions for 
organizations, such as churches, schools, associations and etc., is quite consistent across models 
(Model 1, β1= -0.016, p < 0.01; Model 2, β1= -0.015, p < 0.01) in table 4.2. The longer states have 
ratified ICCPR, the less restrictions governments have on the religious rights of organizations. 
According to model 1, after states ratify ICCPR for 20 years, the level of religious restrictions for 
organization drops by 1/3 of one standard deviation on average across states (the standard 
deviation of dependent variables is one). This finding supports hypothesis 1. It is consistent with 
my theory that governments are under more pressure to improve religious restrictions for religious 
organizations and cannot use the ratification as a cover-up for worsening practices in religious 
freedom due to the fact that religious organizations are more visible and enjoy more connections 
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with the international non-governmental organizations and overseas religious organizations. This 
also supports the spiral model of human rights improvement in which states need time to 
incorporate human rights norms into domestic institutions and eventually protect human rights 
voluntarily (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  
The effect of ICCPR on the protection of religious rights for individuals is different. As it 
is shown from Table 4.3, the duration of ratification of ICCPR has no effect on the protection of 
religious freedom. However, the dummy measure of ratification of ICCPR is positively related 
with the restrictions in religious freedom on individuals in model 4 and 5 (Model 4, β2= 0.061, p 
< 0.10; Model 6, β2= 0.063, p < 0.10). Specifically, after states ratify ICCPR, their level of 
restrictions for religious individuals increase 6% of one standard deviation on average. These 
findings partially support hypothesis 2; states increase their restrictions of religious freedom for 
individuals after ratifying ICCPR, but the restrictions do not grow larger as they ratify ICCPR 
longer. Among the countries which have ratified the ICCPR, some have a poor human rights record 
and severely violate international law in religious freedom, such as North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, 
Iran, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Indonesia. Ratification of ICCPR does not necessarily 
mean intentions and actions to better protect human rights, rather it is a tactic concession they 
made due to external pressures or “window dressing”.  
The effect of optional protocol 1 is consistent with hypothesis 3 that the level of religious 
restrictions on individuals decreases after states ratify the optional protocol 1 to ICCPR. That 
means that states change how they treat individual citizens after they ratify the optional protocol 
1, which gives individual the right to petition UN human rights committee. This also indicates that 
naming and shaming by the UN might affect how states behave. However, the effect is 
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unfortunately not statistically significant (Table 4.3, Model 5, β2= -0.078, p >0.1). That means that 
we cannot be confident that the effect of optional protocol 1 on individual rights protection is 
positive in the whole sample of all states. 
Table 4.2: Regressions of Ratification of ICCPR on Organization Religious Restrictions 
Model Results for Religious Organizations  
 Restrictions on Religious 
Organizations  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Ratificationyear -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Ratification   -0.007 
  (0.029) 
Democracy -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
log(Population) 0.127* 0.087 
 (0.073) (0.075) 
log(GDP) -0.097*** -0.099*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
GDP Growth 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.001** -0.001* 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Internal War -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
External War -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Regime Duration -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Judiciary Independence 0.004 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Christianity(%) 0.108 0.081 
 (0.186) (0.186) 
Islam(%) -0.169 -0.172 
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 (0.366) (0.366) 
Religious Diversity 0.001 0.001 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Religious Establishment 0.360*** 0.347*** 
 (0.092) (0.092) 
N 1494 1494 
R-squared 0.045 0.049 
Adj. R-squared -0.057 -0.054 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
Table 4.3: Regressions of Ratification of ICCPR on Individual Religious Restrictions 
 
Model Results for Religious Individuals  
 Restrictions on Religious Individuals 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
Ratificationyear -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ratification   0.061* 0.063* 
  (0.034) (0.035) 
Ratificationoptional1   -0.078 
   (0.048) 
Democracy -0.006** -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
log(Population) -0.077 -0.065 -0.067 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
log(GDP) -0.052 -0.049 -0.048 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
GDP Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Internal War 0.002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
External War 0.046* 0.046* 0.046* 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
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New Regime 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Judiciary Independence 0.019 0.016 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) 
Christianity (%) -0.148 -0.124 -0.127 
 (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) 
Islam (%) 0.462 0.536 0.525 
 (0.400) (0.401) (0.403) 
Religious Diversity -0.023 -0.019 -0.018 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Religious Establishment -0.048 -0.041 -0.041 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) 
N 1494 1494 1494 
R-squared 0.013 0.015 0.015 
Adj. R-squared -0.096 -0.093 -0.094 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
     
 
4.5 Conclusions and Implications 
In this study, I test the effect of duration of the ratification of ICCPR on religious freedom 
protection for organizations and individuals with fixed effect models. The effects are proven to be 
different on these two dimensions. The ratification of ICCPR leads to a better protection of 
religious rights for organizations; the longer states have ratified ICCPR, the bigger the positive 
effect of ICCPR on the protection of religious rights for organizations. While the duration of 
ratification of the ICCPR has no effect on the protection of religious rights for individuals, the 
ratification of ICCPR leads to a higher level of religious restrictions for individuals. Even though 
groups are more threatening to the authorities, the restrictions on them are earlier to be observed. 
Therefore, states are more likely to change how they treat groups under their international legal 
commitments.  
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This research has great implications for the study of human rights protection. Like most 
other human rights, religious freedom has two dimensions - public and private - which corresponds 
to organizational and individual rights. When the two dimensions of rights are lumped together, 
the dual natures of human rights are ignored. Studies also miss a great opportunity to examine 
whether states show a disingenuous behavior in their compliance with human rights norm. When 
the dual nature of human rights is considered, studies can render a more nuanced understanding of 
states’ behavior in religious freedom and other human rights protections.  
This study also has great implications for the polices in the protection of religious freedom. 
Individuals seem to be more vulnerable facing states’ oppression. More efforts should be made to 
protect the rights of religious individuals, such as public observance of religious practices and 
access to places of worship. Religious individuals are less visible in the society and less organized, 
thus more attention should be given to protect their rights. A few improvements can be made to 
better protect religious freedom. First of all, international communities should seek ways to better 
monitor state behaviors. Even though individuals can file claims against the states in terms of 
human rights abuse at the UN human rights committee, most of the time religious rights abuse of 
individuals happen without being noticed or recorded. The UN human rights committee should 
make more efforts to actively monitor the abuse of rights for individuals on the ground. Even 
though non-governmental human rights organizations have advantages in observing human rights 
abuse, they should try to make more efforts on the individuals’ rights protection. Second, human 
right regimes should increase the costs of violating their international legal obligations. Current 
strategy of naming and shaming might not work for the less visible religious constituents – 
individuals. Alternative solutions, such as economic sanctions and conditions on foreign aid, 
should be adopted to hold states accountable for their actions in human rights abuse. Third, 
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religious freedom advocacy groups should also make efforts to bring the abuse of individual rights 
to the attention of the policy makers.  
Because of the inherently different nature of the two dimensions of religious rights, more 
research questions can be asked. Future research can collect data in a longer time period for 
religious restrictions for organizations and individuals and test the effects of various domestic and 
international factors on the protection of the two dimensions of rights. Future research can also 
test how the two dimensions of religious rights might influence economic development and other 
outcome variables. Furthermore, the study of the two dimensions of human rights can be applied 
in other types of human rights, such as worker’s rights, women’s rights and etc. Most of the studies 
in human rights have focused on the individual rights.  
As a step toward these promising directions, the next chapter will examine how another 
international factor - international human rights organizations (HROs) - influences the protection 
of religious freedom, and whether the domestic presence of HROs and naming and shaming 
campaigns have different effects on the protection of rights for religious individuals versus groups.  
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5 Are International Human Rights Organizations Effective in 
Protecting Religious Freedom? 
 
 
The global community has made great efforts in the protection of human rights since the 
end of WWII. The International Bill of Human Rights set the protection of human rights as a 
common standard for all peoples and nations, and intends to promote these rights by “progressive 
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
territories under their jurisdiction” (page 1-2, The International Bill of Human Rights). Religious 
freedom, as one of the non-derogable rights, according to Article 4 in International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, has a special status in international human rights regimes and is broadly 
supported by human rights Transnational Activism Networks. However, due to the lack of 
enforcement mechanism by human rights regimes, the efforts in the improvement of human rights 
mainly are incentive and norm based. States are expected to improve rights practices under the 
criticism on an international stage (Brysk 1993; Hendrix and Wong 2013; Khagram, Riker, and 
Sikkink n.d.; Sikkink 1993). International human rights organizations are powerful in the 
protection of human rights with their transnational advocacy networks, which transmit information 
in domestic rights violations and mobilize the international audience to pressure states to change 
their behaviors (Keck and Sikkink 1999). States are also expected to change their behavior in 
human rights protection in a spiral model; states eventually internalize international human rights 
standards and change behaviors despite of their initial denial (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  
Recent scientific studies have provided extensive evidence of the positive effects of 
HROs on rights protection. Even though the presence of HROs domestically has a limited effect 
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on the rights protection, naming and shaming campaigns seem to be consistently effective in the 
improvement of human rights (DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012; A. Murdie 2014). However, there are 
two shortcomings in the current state of research in the study of HROs on human rights 
protection. First, the current literature in the scientific study of international human rights 
narrowly focuses on the protection of physical integrity; Second, current literature has not given 
enough attention to the dual nature of human rights: the individual and organizational 
dimensions.  
This study not only expands the scope of international human rights inquiry into religious 
freedom, but also takes into account of both individual and organizational dimensions of religious 
rights. To examine the effect of HROs on religious freedom, I take into account both the presence 
of HROs and direct targeting with naming and shaming campaigns. I find that the mere domestic 
presence of HROs has a positive effect on the protection of rights for religious organizations but 
has no effect on the religious individuals. However, the direct naming and shaming targeting by 
HROs has a positive effect on the protection of rights for religious individuals with no effect on 
organizations.  
This study adds to the existing literature in the following ways: first, this study enriches 
the scientific study of international human rights with religious rights, given the overemphasis of 
physical integrity in the current scholarship. I argue that religious rights include spiritual integrity, 
and are equally important as the physical integrity. Expanding the scope of the human rights 
enables us to have a comprehensive understanding of the factors that could help the protection of 
human rights, and it advances the theoretical development in the field of human rights. Second, 
this study recognizes and differentiates the individual and organizational dimensions of human 
rights. Human rights in general have the public/communal and the private/ dimensions. Without 
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taking account of both dimensions, the study of effects of human rights protections are not 
complete. The overlook of the organizational dimension of human rights also hinders the 
theoretical and policy development in human rights studies.  
5.1 HROs Advocacy and Human Rights Practices 
Early work in empirical studies provide theoretical foundations for the effects of HROs 
advocacy on human rights protection. International human rights organizations (HROs) enjoy 
advantages in transnational networks and information to better hold states accountable for their 
rights violations. Domestic presence of HROs can pressure the oppressing regimes from below 
through the support for local social movements, and from above through the third party states by 
citing reports generated by HROs (Peksen 2009, 2012). In reality, domestic actors often cannot 
pressure states directly, therefore, they seek transnational advocacy networks instead to use 
material and moral leverages to change states behavior(Keck and Sikkink 1999). In the spiral 
model of human rights norm diffusion, there is also a discursive causal process linking HRO 
advocacy on human rights practices. The rights violating states often first deny the abuses alleged 
by HROs, but repressive states will institutionalize and eventually internalize human rights norms 
and change their behavior under the concentrated and continued pressure from HROs and 
international community (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 
Echoing the spiral model of human rights norm diffusion, world society approach in 
sociology offers another theoretical perspective in how the international institutions and culture 
influence the behaviors of nation states and domestic actors. The expansion of HROs contributes 
to the extensive horizontal institutionalization in the world society, which defines the meaning and 
identity of various actors and appropriate patterns of activities. Therefore, HROs lead to the 
adoption of norms of human rights protection among nation states and domestic actors through 
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collective purposes and identities constructed by world culture (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997; Simmons, 
Dobbin, and Garrett 2008; K. Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). 
Recent quantitative cross-national studies provide extensive evidence in the relationship 
between HROs and human rights practices. It is important to differentiate the domestic presence 
of HROs and their naming and shaming campaigns, because their effects on rights protection might 
be different. Even though it is quite consistent that increases in HRO shaming lead to improvement 
in human rights (DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012; A. Murdie 2014), rights violators are only vulnerable 
to international pressure and improve their human rights when HROs criticize them  (Franklin 
2008b; A. Murdie 2014). For example, when women’s rights protection is examined specifically, 
the effect of HROs is more nuanced. Women’s rights international non-governmental 
organizations (WROs) are effective in improving government respect for women’ rights in general. 
However, a targeted naming and shaming publicity strategy is necessary to exert pressure on the 
government to enforce women’s internationally recognized rights, because the mere presence of 
WROs does not have effect on women’ rights(A. Murdie and Peksen 2015). Similarly, Murdie and 
Davis (2012) find that the presence of HROs alone does not improve human rights conditions, but 
HROs presence in pair with HROs targeting with third party pressure do. It is also to be noted that 
domestic presence of HROs leads to naming and shaming campaigns, and more attention and 
condemnation of the human rights abuses by Amnesty international  (Meernik et al. 2012). This 
indicates that the domestic presence of HROs can influence the rights protection through naming 
and shaming campaigns.  
More studies render nuanced findings. The effects of presence and activities of HROs 
might be conditional. The influence of naming and shaming is conditioned by the level economic 
integration in a country(Franklin 2008b); HROs criticism tends to work better when the countries 
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have a stronger tie with other countries. HRO activities also have different effects depending on 
the context and types of rights violations. Presence of HROs members in neighboring countries 
increases the probability of human rights improvements, but that is conditional on the ability of 
the groups to freely move across borders (Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012). The effect of human rights 
advocacy might also be contingent upon regime type. HROs activity provides information, which 
matters more for actors engaged in covert abuses like torture but not for actors engaged in overt 
abuses like death penalty. Therefore, advocacy can lead to improved outcomes in autocracies, 
which tend to engage in covert abuses that HRO activity publicizes. Democracies, on the other 
hand, tend to engage in overt abuses, like the death penalty, and HRO activity does not provide 
new info to the public (Hendrix and Wong 2013).  Hafner-Burton finds naming and shaming have 
negative relationship for some rights, but positive relationship for other rights (Emilie M. Hafner-
Burton 2008b). Naming & shaming improves political rights as states are publicly criticized by 
NGOs, the UN, and the media, but does not limit political terror such as killing and beatings, 
because governments’ capacities for human rights improvements vary across types of violations. 
Governments are strategically using some violations to offset other improvements they make in 
response to international pressure to stop violations. Central governments might not have the 
ability to immediately improve human rights conditions happening on a local level even if they 
intend to (Bagwell and Clay 2017), because of the state capacity.  
Studies also find that HROs can improve the condition of human rights on an individual 
level. The improvement of rights protection does not only rely on states action in a top down 
process, but also on the initiatives of individuals in a bottom up process. The improvement of 
rights protection is a product of the combined efforts from the states, citizens, and other domestic 
and international groups. HROs can provide information to individuals and mobilize them to 
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initiate legal claims to their human rights in domestic legal systems (Simmons 2009b). HROs can 
also initiate information campaigns to educate the domestic population on human rights issues 
(Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz 2012). The embeddedness of a country in global civil society and 
international flows of human resources are important predictors for citizens’ participation in 
human rights campaign. If citizens have a membership in HROs, they are more likely to participate 
in the global human rights movements(Kiyoteru Tsutsui 2006). Bracic (2016b) finds that top down 
rights improvement strategies have a limited effect in changing individuals’ behaviors, but NGOs 
efforts that encourage contact between the majority population and the marginalized groups are 
effective in protecting the rights of minority groups by fostering inclusion.  
Despite of the extensive studies done on the effect of HROs on human rights, there are two 
shortcomings in the current state of literature. There is a narrow focus on the protection of human 
rights. The extant studies have mostly focused on the protection of physical integrity rights, 
therefore, there is a need to explore whether the mechanism of HROs work the same for other 
kinds of rights. Studies have discovered that HROs have different effects on different kinds of 
rights (Emilie M. Hafner-Burton 2008b; Hendrix and Wong 2013). Expanding the scope of human 
rights can strengthen the external validity of the results of current statistical analysis in human 
rights studies. As such an effort, this study focuses on the religious rights. Religious freedom, as a 
spiritual integrity right, is often marginalized in the scientific study of international human rights, 
but it is a recognized international norm in human rights, and of great importance to the dignity 
and wellbeing of individuals and groups with religious beliefs.  
Another shortcoming in the current literature is the lack of the examination of the two 
dimensions of human rights. Most studies focus on the protection of individual rights, and even 
the definition of human rights are restricted to individuals (Donnelly 2013b). However, human 
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rights should include the rights for both individuals and groups. The individual dimension of the 
rights is private; the organizational dimension of human rights is social and collective. For some 
kinds of human rights, such as religious rights and workers’ rights, these two dimensions are 
integral parts. The individual rights practice is limited without the acknowledgment and protection 
of the group dimension of the rights. For example, religious individuals do not have full freedom 
of religion when they are not allowed to have a church. And workers do not have labor rights if 
they are not allowed to form a union. This study makes contribution to the scholarship by taking 
into account of both dimensions of religious rights, and by examining the effects of HROs on the 
protection of religious freedom. 
5.2 Theory and Hypothesis  
Would HROs and naming and shaming campaigns influence how the governments treat 
religious groups and individuals? Religious freedom inherently includes group and individual 
rights (Scolnicov 2010), and it would not be appropriate to assume that HROs take the same effect 
on the protection of these two dimensions of rights. Different mechanisms might take effect with 
the domestic presence of HROs and naming and shaming campaigns. As indicated by the results 
from my exploratory factor analysis in Chapter 3, religious restrictions are indeed operating on 
individual and organizational levels. 
HROs can influence the protection of religious freedom through three channels. First, the 
local HROs can create information (Brysk 1993) on the rights violations by the government. HROs 
operate on a local level in the field, therefore, they are able to collect the first hand information on 
the human rights abuse including religious restrictions. Second, HROs can also mobilize human 
rights movements for the better treatment of the citizens by the governments. HROs not only have 
the information, but also the knowledge on international human rights standards and states’ legal 
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international commitments, thus, they are able to mobilize and provide resources to the religious 
community to fight for their rights. Third, HROs can provide assistance to human rights groups 
(Brysk 1993) to overcome the political barriers they face when they fight for their rights on the 
local level. 
Because human rights social movements led by religious advocates can cause political 
disruptions in society, they may lead the governments to tighten their control of religious groups 
and even violently crush them.  HROs can mediate between the governments and religious groups, 
and work with religious community to avoid the repercussions from the political disruption. HROs 
can decrease the severity of restrictions on religious groups by providing assistance and lessen the 
political repercussions from social movements. When individuals pursue their rights improvement, 
they are less disruptive, therefore, HROs presence on the local level is less effective in their rights 
improvement.  
Thus I hypothesize that: 
H1: The domestic presence of HROs decreases the restrictions of religious groups but not 
of individuals. 
As indicated by the boomerang and spiral models of human rights protection, part of the 
influence of HROs comes from overseas. States are pressured from above by targeting campaigns 
of HROs and the third parties. HROs have extensive transnational advocacy networks and can 
engage in naming and shaming campaigns to induce material and reputational costs on rights 
violating states. In response, rights violating states might deny such practices at first, but will 
eventually improve their rights protection under pressure with reputational concerns (Risse, Ropp, 
and Sikkink 1999).  
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Religious individual rights and group rights are different in their visibility on an 
international stage, therefore, naming and shaming campaigns of HROs might have different 
effects on them. Religious individual rights have an emphasis on the expression of one’s belief, 
while the group rights are more about the group identity (Scolnicov 2010). Religious groups have 
a social, communitarian dimension (Scolnicov 2010). Therefore, religious groups enjoy a higher 
visibility in comparison to the individuals. Also, the restrictions of religious groups are more overt 
in general. For example, the favoritism of the orthodox church by Russian government is highly 
visible and well known. The restrictions of religious organizations are usually conducted overtly 
based on the claims of disruptions of social orders, subversion of state authority, etc. The public 
and media already have relevant information on the restrictions of religious groups, therefore 
naming and shaming campaigns do not provide additional information to the international 
audience and should exert no influence on states behavior in religious freedom for groups. 
In contrast, religious individuals are relatively less visible on the internationals stage and 
restrictions on religious practice of individuals are more covert. The information on the restrictions 
and persecution of religious individuals are mostly hidden intentionally from the public and media 
by the authoritarian regimes to avoid the criticism. On the other hand, violation of religious rights 
of individuals is often conducted by the local officials and police, therefore, there is a principal 
agent problem due to the state capacity (Englehart 2009b). States are restricted by their capacity 
to monitor abuses on an individual level and evidence of violations is harder to collect on a local 
level. The local HROs can gather information on rights violations and then transmit overseas 
through transnational advocacy networks. When HROs launch naming and shaming campaigns 
targeting the states on religious restrictions of individuals, HROs provide new information to the 
public and international audience. Therefore, the naming and shaming campaigns would pressure 
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states to improve rights protection due to their vulnerability to moral pressure from reputation 
concerns.  
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2: Direct targeting by HROs decreases the restrictions of religious individuals but has 
no effect on the restrictions of religious groups. 
5.3 Data and Methods 
5.3.1 Data 
By aggregating data needed for all the variables in this research, I have created a panel 
dataset. After performing list-wise deletion, the data includes 118 entities (countries) across 14 
years from 1990 to 2003.  
The dependent variables tested are the religious restrictions on organizations (𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑔) and 
religious restrictions on individuals (𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑). Those two variables are two factors derived from 
the index on religious restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) dataset (Fox 
2015) based on the factor analysis in chapter 3.  
The main independent variables are the measures for the presence of HROs, direct 
targeting by HROs. The presence of HROs is operationalized as the number of HROs within 
each country. This variable is measured by the number of INGOs listed in the Yearbook of 
International Organizations with a human rights focus with members or volunteers in a specific 
country in a specific year (J. Smith and Wiest 2005). Naming and shaming targeting data is 
collected from IDEA project, which focuses on all Reuters Global News Series reports 
concerning HROs. HRO shaming variable is coded as the yearly count of the number of HRO 
conflictual events that occurred toward a government in a given year from the IDEA data.  
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According the previous chapter, I control the ratification of ICCPR. The ICCPR is the only 
treaty that protects religious freedom and upholds the values in UDHR regarding religious 
freedom. Data on the ratification by country and year is collected from the United Nations Treaty 
Collection website. I operationalized ratification of ICCPR as a dummy variable (Ratification), 
which is coded as 1 when states have ratified ICCPR, otherwise it is coded as 0. In addition, I 
include the same control variables as the statistical models in chapter 4.  I also control the indirect 
targeting by the third actors (Murdie and Davis 2012). The Indirect Targeting is a count of all 
conflictual targeting of governments or non-governmental actors where HROs are cited, but the 
source of the event is not the HRO but an alternative third-party actor outside of the targeted state.  
The basic data statistics of the above variables are in the table 5.1 below.  
Table 5 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
GRRorg 1,494 -0.0 1.0 -1.4 -0.5 -0.03 4.0 
GRRind 1,494 -0.0 1.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 8.2 
HROs 1,494 38.4 23.4 1 20.7 51 139 
Direct Targeting 1,315 0.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 
Indirect Targeting 491 3.1 5.9 0.0 0.0 4.0 55.0 
Ratification 1,494 14.0 9.7 0 5 22 36 
POLITY2 1,494 3.8 6.3 -10 -2 9 10 
population 1,494 16.2 1.5 11.2 15.3 17.1 20.8 
GDP 1,494 23.7 2.2 18.9 22.1 25.4 30.1 
GDPgrowth 1,494 3.2 5.3 -50.2 1.6 5.6 35.2 
Trade 1,494 71.4 38.1 11.1 46.3 85.7 280.4 
Internal war 1,494 0.7 1.6 0 0 0 10 
External war 1,494 0.03 0.3 0 0 0 4 
regime 1,494 22.4 31.2 0 4 30 194 
Islam 1,494 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.002 0.3 1.0 
Christian 1,494 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.9 1.0 
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Diversity 1,494 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
Establishment 1,494 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 1 
        
5.3.2 Statistical Modeling 
Because of the considerable heterogeneity among the countries examined in this study as 
panel data, the pooled OLS models may not be proper methods to estimate the effects of the 
independent variable on religious restrictions. This study uses fixed effect models to examine the 
“within” effect of the ratification of ICCPR in countries, taking account of both the heterogeneity 
across countries and years. The estimates of this study should reveal whether states change 
behavior in religious freedom after they ratify the treaty within the time frame in this study. I will 
test the following models: 
Fixed Effect Models: 𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑔/𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑 = (𝑖+𝑡) + 𝛽1𝐻𝑅𝑂𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
+𝛽3 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
In this model, 𝑖 is the individual effect and 𝑡 is the time effect. 𝑖 captures the effects 
that are specific to some countries but constant over time, whereas 𝑡 captures effects that are 
specific to some time period but constant over countries. Controlling for time effect is necessary. 
First, important international events such as the end of Cold War and the deepening of 
globalization happened during 1990-2008. Also, there is an increasing trend in the past decades 
that human rights data are inflated due to the higher of accountability and better data collection 
methods (Fariss 2017). Taking account of fixed effect of years helps alleviate this problem.  𝑖𝑡 is 
the error term in this model.  𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of control variables including political regime, 
judiciary independence, population, GDP size, GDP growth rate, the proportion of trade in GDP, 
internal war and external war, and regime duration.  
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 The Effect of Domestic Presence of HROs  
HROs are helpful in the protection of religious freedom, and the effects are different for 
religious groups and individuals. As shown in Table 5.2, HROs are related to a better protection 
of religious rights for organizations as indicated by model 1,2 and 3 (Model 1, β1= -0.003, p < 
0.05; Model 2, β1= -0.003, p < 0.10; Model 3, β1= -0.007, p < 0.10), which is consistent with the 
hypothesis 1. Substantively, one human rights organization in a country can decrease 0.3% of one 
standard deviation of religious restrictions on organizations; an increase on the number of human 
rights organization from 1 to 139 can lead to the decrease of around 40% standard deviation of 
religious restrictions for religious organizations on average in model. The size of effect does not 
change after the number of naming and shaming events are held at constant in model 2, but the 
effect is almost doubled in the model 3 when the indirect targeting variable is taken account. 
Around 139 HROs can decrease the restriction of religious organization by almost one standard 
deviation when both the direct and indirect targeting events are held constant. HROs are useful in 
pressuring states from below to change their policy and practice in religious rights towards 
organizations.  The same result is supported by the base model in the appendix in Table 4, even 
though the effect size is slightly different (Model 1, β1= -0.005, p < 0.01).  
 However, the effect of HROs is not statistically significant in their protection of individual 
religious rights across all three models in Table 5.3. The effect is the same in the base model in 
Table 5.4. This indicates that the mere domestic presence of HROs is not helpful in the protection 
of religious rights for individuals. HROs are not effective in pressuring states to change their 
treatment of religious individuals by mobilizing them to fight for their rights in legal and other 
                                                                                   88 
 
 
realms. This is might be due to the different nature of religious organizations and individuals: 
religious restrictions for organizations are public, and restrictions for individuals are more private. 
Therefore, states tend to behave hypocritically by changing their human rights records in the 
public, and not changing practice towards private citizens. 
5.4.2 Direct Targeting by HROs 
The direct targeting by naming and shaming campaigns towards the rights abusing states 
is effective in the protecting of religious rights for individuals. As shown from the model 5 (β2= -
0.004, p < 0.05) and 6 (β2= -0.007, p < 0.10) in the table 5.3, direct targeting has a similar size of 
effect as the HROs. One event of naming and shaming by HROs towards country can decrease 
0.4% of one standard deviation of religious restrictions on organizations when the number HROs 
are held constant; if the HROs name and shame the target country for 27 times, the targeting 
country decreases around 10% of one standard deviation of religious restrictions for religious 
individuals on average. The size of effects is almost doubled in the model 6, even though the effect 
is not statistically significant in the base model in Table 4.  The results in Model 5 and 6 confirm 
the hypothesis 2 that naming and shaming provide additional information to the international 
audience about the violation of religious rights for individuals, and these campaigns impose 
reputational costs on targeting states and change their behavior in religious freedom. Religious 
rights of individuals are widely recognized as human rights in the international community, 
therefore, states face a great backlash when these rights violations are exposed to the international 
audience and are more likely to make improvements. Therefore, states are pressured from above 
through naming and shaming to improve their protection of religious individuals.  
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The effect of direct targeting on religious organizations is not statistically significant as 
indicated by model 2 and 3 in Table 5.2. The naming and shaming campaigns do not change states 
practice in the religious rights of organizations. This is consistent with hypothesis 2. Organizations 
are more public and restrictions of religious organizations are more overt, therefore, the naming 
and shaming by HROs do not provide additional information to the international community in 
terms of the violation of religious rights and do not impose reputational costs on the targeting 
states. Alternatively, religious organizations pose a bigger threat to regimes’ rule domestically, 
and states are less likely to make compromises when named and shamed on an international stage. 
When facing the criticism from HROs, states also often use the disruption of the public order and 
subversion of the state powers to legitimate the limitation of religious organizations. Therefore, 
states are less likely to compromise, despite of reputational costs for the violations of religious 
rights. 
As an important control variable, the indirect targeting by the third actors have no 
statistically significant effect on the protection of individual and group rights based on model 3 
and 6. Naming and shaming by the third parties do not induce meaningful reputational costs for 
religious organizations, because the abuse for religious organizations is already public and 
revealed. Targeted states do not change their treatment of religious individuals after the third 
parties target them with naming and shaming campaigns when the number of HROs and the 
number of direct targeting by HROs are held constant. The indirect targeting by third parties does 
not provide additional information on restrictions of individuals after the shaming campaigns by 
HROs, and it is also not able to weaken the coercive power of the states. Therefore, indirect 
targeting is not effective in reducing the rights violations for individuals. However, this could also 
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be the result from the lack of data on the indirect targeting variable in the years covered in this 
study.  
Table 5. 2: Model Results of Religious Organizations 
 Restrictions on Religious Organizations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
HROs -0.003** -0.003** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Direct Targeting  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Indirect Targeting   0.0001 
   (0.003) 
Ratification of ICCPR -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) 
Democracy -0.002 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
log(Population) 0.085 0.317** 0.262 
 (0.075) (0.158) (0.397) 
log(GDP) -0.098*** -0.107*** -0.140 
 (0.030) (0.037) (0.086) 
GDP Growth 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.001* -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Internal War -0.005 0.005 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) 
External War -0.011 -0.004 -0.059 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.051) 
New Regime -0.0004 0.0002 -0.00004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Christianity(%) 0.082 0.020 0.315 
 (0.186) (0.205) (0.379) 
Islam(%) -0.193 0.030 1.621 
 (0.363) (0.447) (1.364) 
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Religious Diversity -0.003 0.0005 -0.083 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.127) 
Religious Establishment 0.346*** 0.317*** 0.654*** 
 (0.092) (0.098) (0.174) 
N 1494 1315 491 
R-squared 0.049 0.056 0.097 
Adj. R-squared -0.053 -0.059 -0.219 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
Table 5. 3: Model Results for Religious Individuals 
 Restrictions on Religious Individuals 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
HROs 0.00000 -0.0005 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Direct Targeting  -0.004** -0.007* 
  (0.002) (0.004) 
Indirect Targeting   0.0001 
   (0.002) 
Ratification of ICCPR -0.006 -0.001 -0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) 
Democracy -0.005* -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
log(Population) -0.073 -0.210*** -0.913*** 
 (0.082) (0.063) (0.226) 
log(GDP) -0.050 0.028* 0.022 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.049) 
GDP Growth 0.001 0.001 0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.002) 
Trade (% GDP) -0.0003 0.0001 -0.001 
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.001) 
Internal War 0.0002 0.011*** 0.037*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) 
External War 0.045* 0.064*** 0.208*** 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.029) 
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New Regime 0.0004 0.0002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Christianity(%) -0.146 -0.122 -0.462** 
 (0.203) (0.082) (0.216) 
Islam(%) 0.499 0.271 1.648** 
 (0.396) (0.178) (0.778) 
Religious Diversity -0.022 -0.011 -0.107 
 (0.044) (0.018) (0.072) 
Religious Establishment -0.045 -0.024 0.012 
 (0.101) (0.039) (0.099) 
N 1494 1315 491 
R-squared 0.011 0.057 0.211 
Adj. R-squared -0.095 -0.058 -0.066 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
5.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This study examines the effects of HROs and targeting campaigns on the protection of two 
dimensions of religious rights. The mere presence of HROs within a country only has an influence 
in reducing the level of restrictions for organizations, while no effect on the protection of religious 
individuals. This indicates that domestic HROs play an important role working with religious 
organizations to pressure the states from below to change their policies and practices in religious 
freedom. HROs are able to provide information and resources to the religious organizations to 
engage in local social movements for religious freedom. 
However, the direct targeting events with naming and shaming are only effective for the 
protection of religious rights for individuals. The restrictions of religious individuals are more 
covert. Transnational advocacy networks of HROs transmit the information on the restrictions of 
religious individuals, and name and shame rights violating states on the international stage. In 
contrast, the restrictions of religious organizations are more overt, and the transnational advocacy 
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networks do not necessarily provide additional information to the international audience, therefore, 
the governments in the rights violating states do not carry the reputational costs in terms of 
restrictions for religious organizations.  
This study has great theoretical implications. This study expands the current literature in 
HROs and human rights study by focusing on religious rights and their two dimensions. The 
findings indicate that domestic HROs and targeting campaigns are effective in the religious rights 
protection, which is consistent with the most current literature on other kinds of rights protection. 
In the meantime, there is also a more nuanced finding that both HROs and targeting campaigns 
influence the rights protection for individuals and groups differently. This finding supports the 
most important theoretical advancement in this study: the two dimensions of religious rights are 
inherently different; religious restrictions on groups are public and overt, and restrictions on 
individuals are private and covert. HROs support the religious organizations in social movements 
to pressure their governments from below, and the naming and shaming campaigns overseas 
uncover the restrictions on individuals and pressure states from top.  This indicates that there is a 
need to differentiate individual and group rights in international human rights studies to further 
our understanding and advance more novel theories in human rights protection.  
This study also has great implications for the policies in international human rights 
protection. The domestic presence of HROs is useful in protecting the rights of religious 
organizations but not for individuals, while the direct targeting by HROs are effective in reducing 
the level of restrictions on individuals. We need to acknowledge that HROs are improving the 
protection of human rights on the grassroots level, despite of the lack of enforcement in 
international human rights regimes. As moral agents, transnational advocacy networks play an 
important role to pressure states to change how they treat their citizens with the information, 
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networks and other resources. In the meantime, we also need to reflect on why domestic HROs are 
less effective in combating the human rights abuse for individuals, and why targeting campaigns 
overseas are not able to change how states restrict religious groups. HROs and other international 
actors need to strengthen the part of the work that current strategies are not effective, and further 
develop the strategies that work great to hold states accountable.  
There are also a few limitations in this study which can be addressed by future studies. The 
first lies in the limitation of the data. First, the data only contains the data from 1990 to 2003. The 
results can have stronger internal validity if the years covered in this study are longer. Future 
studies can collect more data with longer time span and test the same theories in this study.  Second, 
measurement on HROs and Direct Targeting can be improved. As the study by Murdie and Peksen 
(2015) shows, the HROs and direct targeting with a specific focus on certain kind(s) of human 
rights can be more effective in combating the corresponding human rights violations. A way to 
improve this study is to collect the data on the number of religious HROs, and direct targeting on 
religious freedom across years and countries. The relationships found in this study might be 
strengthened with these new measures and data. Third, another variable can improve religious 
freedom through pressuring states is international religious organizations. Most churches and other 
religious organizations are transnational, especially with the globalization in the past a few 
decades. Therefore, these organizations can also take on the similar functions as HROs to transmit 
information, expose rights violations and pressure the states overseas. Future studies can collect 
the suggested data and strengthen the findings in this study.  
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6 Globalization and the Two Dimensions of Religious Freedom 
 
In recent years, there has been a rise of nationalist movements around the world. Not only 
have nationalist political parties and public officials been elected into office in Europe, America, 
and Asian countries, nationalist social groups also have surfaced. Minority religious groups are 
the obvious targets for the nationalists, and an increasing number of religious groups are attacked 
by government officials and social groups with discriminatory rhetoric and policies (Pew 
Research Center 2018). 
 As the world becomes globalized, exchanges of religious beliefs across borders have 
become common, but this influx of new values, ideologies and norms have posed threats to the 
local religious system and identities built from religions. The religious nationalist movement is a 
battle between the international and local culture and between the majority/local religions and 
the minority/new religions. The tensions between religious and national identities prompts 
discriminatory behaviors and policies towards the immigrants and minority religious groups. 
Religious restrictions are the consequences of the conflicts between globalization and nationalist 
movements.  
Studies on the influence of globalization on governments’ respect for human rights, 
which has mostly focused on physical integrity rights, security rights, and workers’ rights, render 
mixed results (W. H. Meyer 1996; W. Meyer 1998; Hafner-Burton 2003; Reuveny and Li 2003; 
Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001). Religion is a value system, but it is also a core identity and 
centers other value systems an individual holds and often mixes with national identities. When 
globalization threatens the identities people hold, they fight it back. That is why we witness the 
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rise of religious restrictions despite the efforts made by international human rights instruments, 
regional human rights regimes, intergovernmental organizations, human rights organizations 
(HROs), and western democracies. By examining the data on globalization and religious 
restrictions across 188 countries in the past 10 years (2007-2016), this study explores whether 
globalization has contributed to the rise of religious restrictions empirically while taking account 
of alternative explanations of religious restrictions. This study not only analyzes the influence of 
aggregate globalization, but also the individual influences of economic, political, and social 
globalization on religious freedom. Due to the dual nature of religious freedom, this study also 
examines whether globalization influences the religious freedom for individuals and groups 
differently. 
I will begin with a literature review of globalization and human rights protection, then 
discuss the connections between globalization and religious nationalism and generate hypotheses 
between globalization and religious restrictions. I will use fixed effect models to analyze the data 
and explain the results and their implications in the study of religious freedom, human rights, and 
globalization.  
6.1 Globalization and Human Rights Protection 
Studies of globalization and human rights protections have mainly focused on economic 
globalization. There have been two competing camps regarding how economic development and 
globalization relate to the human rights protections. Neo-liberalism supporters believe that 
globalization and foreign investments lead to economic development, which creates jobs, 
improves living standards, develops technologies, provides health care, and eventually increases 
the size of the middle class in developing countries. The rising middle class would eventually 
want liberalization of thought, speech, movement, civil and political rights from the authorities. 
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On the other hand, environmental advocates, human rights activists, and some economists hold 
that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) do not contribute to the better protections of human 
rights, instead they might lead to more human rights violations. MNCs mainly drain natural 
resources and exploit labor, and not necessarily create new jobs and introduce new technologies, 
so developing countries continue to be poor. The capital flows also lead to the instability of the 
financial system. Poverty and instability can lead to social unrest, which usually brings on 
repression (W. Meyer 1998; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001).  
Empirical studies have shown mixed findings on relationships between economic 
globalization and human rights protections. Based on different measurements of economic 
openness and integration, results can be different. Using Foreign Direct Investment as a proxy of 
economic globalization, cross national studies find that multinational corporations, foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment are positively related with political, civil, economic, social 
rights in the third world (Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; W. H. Meyer 1996;W. Meyer 
1998) , which supports the theory proposed by the neo-liberalism. Using alternative measures of 
human rights practice, economic globalization, and new data analysis methods, other studies find 
the relationship between economic integration and human rights record almost does not exist or 
is negative. (Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999, Milner 1998, Sorens and Ruger 2012).  
Studies in the institutions and policies promoting economic globalization find that 
international trade agreements transform government observance of human rights today, because 
they provide governments with the interests and the incentives to implement domestic human 
rights policies and decrease their employment of repressive practices (Hafner-Burton 2003, 
Hafner-Burton 2005). The WTO also plays an important role in bringing trade practices in line 
with human rights objectives under ITA. Transnational corporations not only can benefit human 
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rights by promoting economic development but also have the culture to conduct business with an 
eye toward the greater good (Kinley 2009).  
Social and political globalization is less studied in the protection of human rights. 
Political and social globalization may impact human rights protections by spreading democratic 
norms globally (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Social integration impacts human rights through 
the spread of norms and ideals across space (Bhagwati 2004), and they promote the activities of 
NGOs and activists (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms of cooperation and exchange can 
replace the norms of discrimination and suspicion in the process of social integration (Mousseau 
and Mousseau 2008). Political integration also enhances the exchanges between states through 
bilateral and multilateral channels. Memberships to human rights international agreements and 
the spread of the democratic norms also promote the protection of human rights (Fariss 2017;  
Landman 2005; Cole 2005). Taking account of all three dimensions of globalization – economic 
political, and social – on human rights protections and employing different cross national data, 
studies have discovered some positive impacts of globalization on the protection of human rights 
(Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011;Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012).  
In general, there is not a conclusive relationship between globalization and human rights 
protection. Past studies not only have heavily focused on physical integrity, security rights and 
workers’ rights, but also have discovered that globalization influences different aspects of human 
rights differently, which indicates different categories of human rights do not always move 
together (Milner 1998). Thus, it might not be appropriate to assume the relationship between 
globalization and religious freedom based on the relationship between globalization and physical 
integrity rights, for example. 
                                                                                   99 
 
 
6.2 Globalization, the Rise of Nationalism and Religious Restrictions 
A recent report by the Pew Research Center finds a global uptick in government restrictions 
on religion in 2016, and nationalist parties and organizations played an increasing role in 
harassment of religious minorities. The percentages of countries with high and very high levels of 
government restrictions rose from 25% in 2015 to 28% in 2016. Nationalist political parties and 
government officials have attacked religious groups with anti-minority and anti-immigration 
rhetoric and policies in Europe, America, and Asia. There was a 5% increase of the cases the 
nationalist parties and officials verbally attacking religious groups from 2015 to 2016. At the 
forefront of globalization, 33% of the European countries and 12% of Asian countries saw this 
kind of incidents in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018), and this suggests this trend is intensifying. 
The phenomenon that societal forces push back against globalization as it deepens is nothing new. 
Karl Polanyi has already warned us in the 40s that there is a disconnection between the values and 
norms in human society, and the materialistic characteristics of market economy, so the society 
will eventually fight back against the market economy to defend its interests (Polanyi 2001). It is 
the reality now that nationalists have waged a war to preserve the local identity, culture and value 
systems.  
Globalization and religion have some irreconcilable conflicts. Due to the development of 
the technology, there has been a fast growth of the communications between people, cultures, 
societies, and civilizations that were historically more isolated. The increasing pluralism of the 
values in a single social unit tends to attenuate the differences among different value systems and 
ways of life. “Globalization tends to facilitate the detachment of religion, culture and territory, 
thus unravels religious traditions from particular cultures and nationalities” (Roy 2006). In a 
plural system, no single value is “correct”, and the value systems become relative. Thus, the 
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social structures can be renewed in globalized communities. However, religion by nature is 
against this trend, because religious faith is related to a particular and absolute identity, and has 
immutable sacredness, which does comply with the relativism trendy in the globalization. It is 
not surprising, therefore, to witness the efforts by religious groups to preserve, stabilize and 
create particular identity to counter the tendency of the globalized system to relativize them (P. 
F. Beyer 1994).  
However, the fights against globalization by religious groups often come in the form of 
religious nationalist movements. The importance of studying collective identity in international 
politics has been in the constructivist tradition (Abdelal et al. 2006). Religious identity is also 
often intertwined to national identity due to historical and cultural reasons. Religion itself can be 
perceived as a national identity, which is how the nation is perceived religiously. Religion as a 
core identity for individuals, groups and nations is hard to compromise and sacrifice. Due to the 
penetration of new religious ideas and groups, national identities are threatened, whether 
religious or secular. As a response to this threat, majority traditions/religions in these cultures 
will respond with a closer identification of religion and national identity which creates divisions 
and political fallout. This explains the rising of nationalist political parties in Europe, America, 
and Asia in recent years. States also are more likely to restrict the transnational religious 
communities as threats to national and local identities to control their presence and proselytizing 
activities (Banchoff 2008).  
Some scholars argue that increasing religious restrictions are due to the perceived 
psychological threat to the majority religion from minority religions. This is a consequence of 
the frequent and easy contact between different religious traditions created by economic, 
political and social integrations. Incoming religious groups and their values systems have the 
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potential to challenge the majority’s dominant status. Empirical findings do support that 
globalization has led to the worsening of religious discrimination of the minorities through 
religious policies ( Bloom, Arikan, and Sommer 2014). This theory explains well why 
governmental regulations and social hostilities towards minority religions are rising, but is less 
effective in explaining why governmental restrictions towards all religious groups have increased 
and why the restrictions and discrimination sometimes come in the package of nationalist 
movements. I argue that it is not only majority religious groups that are threatened, but also 
religious and secular governments. Majority religious groups would attack and exclude the 
minority religious groups to preserve local and dominant value systems, while the public 
officials and political parties want to use nationalist movements and identity politics to 
strengthen their rule. Facing intense political, social and economic integrations worldwide, 
secular governments would try to strengthen their control of the nation and preserve the secular 
national identity by tightening its regulations on all religious groups.  
Scholars also have examined religious nationalism as a consequence of globalization on a 
micro-level, in the perspective of social psychology. Globalization as a revolution disrupts the 
traditions and customs of a people by creating insecurity (Kurth 2009), because space and time 
are compressed and events are becoming localized. Individuals tend to feel uncertain and 
insecure about what the future holds, especially when they are left out in the process of 
globalization. Their value systems are frequently challenged by the new values, norms and 
behaviors brought in by globalization. As insecurity and anxieties grow, people tend to reaffirm 
their self-identity or hold onto a collective identity to provide them with some stability and 
security. Nationalism and religion “supply particularly powerful stories and beliefs because of 
their ability to convey a picture of security, stability and simple answers” (742, Kinnvall 2004) 
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This explains why we see national governments  responding to their citizens’ concerns to tighten 
security and close borders to immigrants and refugees with nationalist policies, and why more 
nationalist religious groups are popping up to harass minority religious groups. Empirical studies 
have found Christian nationalist ideology is an important reason that Americans voted for 
Donald Trump in 2016 (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018). Christian nationalist belief also 
relates to the anti-Muslim attitudes and opinion (Shortle and Gaddie 2015), and anti-immigration 
attitudes in the U.S. ( McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011). Muslim groups were targeted 
most by nationalist groups in Europe and America in the year of 2016.  
6.3 Globalization and the Two Dimensions of Religious Restrictions 
Globalization threatens traditional meaning systems; therefore, it has brought challenges 
to people’s religious identities and psychological securities. Nationalist governments reach out to 
people with nationalist rhetoric and polices to regulate and discriminate religious groups and 
individuals under the name of preserving the local values, norms, identities and interests. Based 
on the dual nature of religious groups and individuals, would this process influence these two 
dimensions of religion differently?  
First, governments are more likely to target religious groups, when they are prompted by 
the nationalist sentiments to restrict minority or new religions. The communal and social 
dimension of the religious expression is more threatening to the states. The private practice of 
religion by individuals, such as praying, reading texts and donating are less threatening to the 
majority religions and secular governments. However, the group dimension of religions, such as 
attending churches, religious schools, joining religious associations and parties, pose more 
threats. The group dimension of certain religion is seen as a competing force to the dominant 
status of the majority religion or the secular government in the public space. As the nationalist 
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movements proceed, secular governments and dominant religions would try to limit the public 
expression of these religions. However, this does not explain why the restrictions on groups 
increase as the globalization deepens.  
The group dimension of religious expression grows as globalization deepens, thus the 
restrictions on groups also increase. Just as globalization has made the economic and political 
systems more westernized, the globalization of religion has made Christianity more or less the 
“imperial” standard for religion in our globalized world (P. Beyer and Beaman 2007). As one of 
the influences of this globalization trend, the communal dimension of religion expresses itself 
through organization. In the religious anti-globalization movement, religions either demand 
justice or defend their tradition (Beyer and Beaman 2007, 339).  As religions resort to more 
differentiation to have a clear identity, they take on more organized institutional form. Therefore, 
as more and more religions resort to highly organized forms to differentiate themselves from 
others, they pose an increasing higher level of threat to the rulers. Restrictions on religious 
groups increase as globalization deepens, because the tension between religious groups and 
rulers becomes more heightened as religions become more globalized.   
Religious groups face harsher restrictions because they are more interconnected all over 
the world with globalization. The development of technology in communication and 
transportation has facilitated the connection between religious organizations. Because of 
transnational networks among religious organizations, religious groups are able to transmit 
information on their restrictions and persecution overseas. Another development connecting 
religious communities further is the rapid growth of faith-based international human rights 
organizations (RINGOs). RINGOs both contribute to and are generated by globalization. 
Protestant and Catholic RINGOs are the most numerous and dominate the religious segment of 
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the global public sphere (John Boli and David Brwington 2007). Because of transnational 
networks, religious organizations can advocate for their sister organizations in countries where 
they are highly restricted. These religious organization and RINGOs can provide information to 
UN, other international human rights regimes, and western democracy to pressure the rights 
violating states. It is not uncommon that a third party, such as the U.S., criticizes human rights 
violations in certain countries. Therefore, there is an increased risk for states to get named and 
shamed on an international stage when religious groups are highly connected. As globalization 
deepens, nationalist movements heighten and transnational religious networks grows, restrictions 
on the group dimension of religion increases. 
 I hypothesize that: 
H1: Globalization increases governments’ restrictions of religious freedom for groups. 
However, globalization might influence the protection of religious freedom for the 
individuals differently. Individual practice of religion such as praying or reading religious texts is 
less threatening to states, because the practice of individual expression is not in an organized 
setting. Also, when the particularity of religious identity is threatened by globalization, religion 
stresses its organizational dimension rather than the individual dimension to strengthen the 
differentiation of its identity from other religions. In addition, when nationalist movements push 
back globalization, religious individuals are less likely to be the target, since the individual 
practice of religion is private and not in the public sphere. Even though religious individuals can 
also be involved in transnational networks, states are less worried, because of the limited 
influence of the individuals. Therefore, as globalization deepens, states do not change how they 
behave towards individuals.  
I hypothesize that: 
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H2: Globalization does not have an effect on governments’ restrictions of religious 
freedom for individuals. 
6.4 Data and Methods 
This study uses one pooled cross-national time-series data set from the Religion and State 
data set round 2 containing information about 118 countries on religious restrictions and 
globalization from the years 1990-2003(even though the actual number of countries and 
observations included in this study might be less due to the missing data in the variables). 
Globalization is examined in economic, political and social dimensions. This data set is a panel 
data set and years nested within countries. 
6.4.1 Dependent Variable: Government Religious Restrictions  
 
Religious freedom is an important variable in religion and human rights research projects, 
but it has never been measured directly, because most freedoms can only be measured by the 
degree to which they are denied. Religious freedom has been measured by states’ violation of 
religious freedom norms by different researchers, such as Government Religious Restrictions 
Index (GRI) by Pew research center, RAS2 dataset by Jonathon Fox, International Religious 
Freedom dataset by Brian Grim and Roger Finke, and CIRI Human Rights Data Project by David 
Richards at el. 
The dependent variables tested are the religious restrictions on organizations (𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑔) and 
religious restrictions on individuals (𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑). Those two variables are two factors derived from 
the index on religious restrictions in Religion and State Dataset Round 2 (RAS 2) dataset (Fox 
2015). More detailed explanations of the two factors and the factor analysis are to follow. The 
RAS2 dataset uses detailed indicators to measure Regulation of and Restrictions on the Majority 
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Religion and All Religions (NX) and each indicator ranges from 0 (no restrictions) to 3 (large scales 
of restrictions). This dataset was collected upon multiple sources and has high internal validity.  
6.4.2 Independent Variables: 
6.4.2.1  Globalization  
The KOF index of Globalization by the Swiss economic institute is used to measure 
globalization. It conceptualizes globalization as a process that “erodes national boundaries, 
integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex 
relations of mutual interdependence” (KOF Globalization Index codebook, 2016). The overall 
index includes economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization. In each dimension, 
the index is both measured in the de jure aspect of globalization and also the de facto aspect. De 
jure means the institutional characteristics, laws and policies that make globalization possible; de 
facto globalization is the actual amount of the exchanges of the goods, capitals, communications, 
information and etc. There are also 24 sub-dimension questions to evaluate the three dimensions 
of globalization to generate a comprehensive measure of globalization.  
The KOF index defines the economic globalization as actual economic flows between 
countries and the level of restrictions of capital and trade flows which act as significant obstacles 
to market access. Social globalization is measured by the personal contacts among people living 
in different countries, information flows from different countries, and cultural proximity. 
Political globalization is measured by the degree of a country’s political integration through 
diplomatic relations with the rest of the world and participation in peace missions and 
international relations. Each variable was transformed into an index on a 0 to 10 scale. Higher 
values denote the higher degrees of globalization. The aggregate measure of globalization is 
scaled as an index going from 0 to 100. The higher values mean higher levels of globalization. 
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The values are calculated by the percentiles of the original distribution. The weights of the sub-
indices are determined by the principle components analysis for the entire sample of countries 
and years. This method allows the index captures more variance in the data. The three 
dimensions of globalization are highly correlated with the aggregate globalization variable and 
the three dimensions are also correlated with each other, though to a lesser extent (Table 6.1). 
Therefore, globalization and the three dimensions are tested individually in the statistical models 
to avoid the multicollinearity problem.  
Table 6. 1 Correlations between the Dimensions of Globalization 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation P Value 
Globalization Economic Globalization 0.80 0.00 
Globalization Social Globalization 0.81 0.00 
Globalization Political Globalization 0.74 0.00 
Economic Globalization Political Globalization 0.25 0.00 
Social Globalization Political Globalization 0.28 0.00 
Economic Globalization Social Globalization 0.82 0.00 
 
6.4.2.2 Control Variables: 
To follow the line of research in international human rights and religious freedom, I control 
the same variables as chapters 4 and 5. I also include a dummy variable (Ratification), which is 
coded as 1 when states have ratified ICCPR, otherwise it is coded as 0, and the presence of HROs 
is operationalized as the number of HROs within each country (J. Smith and Wiest 2005). 
The basic data statistics of the above variables are in the table 6.2 below.  
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
 
GRRorg 1,494 0.0 1.0 -1.4 -0.5 -0.03 4.0 
GRRind 1,494 -0.0 1.0 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 8.2 
Overall globalization 1,472 50.3 18.0 17.3 36.4 61.8 91.9 
Economic globalization 1,442 51.3 18.7 7.8 38.5 63.0 98.6 
Political globalization 1,486 60.9 22.3 3.1 41.8 81.5 98.3 
Social glob 1,472 41.7 22.2 7.1 23.1 56.1 93.6 
RATIF 1,494 0.9 0.4 0 1 1 1 
HROs 1,494 38.4 23.4 1 20.7 51 139 
Ratification 1,494 14.0 9.7 0 5 22 36 
POLITY2 1,494 3.8 6.3 -10 -2 9 10 
Population 1,494 16.2 1.5 11.2 15.3 17.1 20.8 
GDP 1,494 23.7 2.2 18.9 22.1 25.4 30.1 
GDPgrowth 1,494 3.2 5.3 -50.2 1.6 5.6 35.2 
Internal war 1,494 0.7 1.6 0 0 0 10 
External war 1,494 0.03 0.3 0 0 0 4 
Regime duration 1,494 22.4 31.2 0 4 30 194 
Islam % 1,494 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.002 0.3 1.0 
Christian % 1,494 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.9 1.0 
Religious Diversity 1,494 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
Religious Establishment 1,494 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 1 
        
 
6.4.3 Statistical Modeling 
Because of the considerable heterogeneity among the countries examined in this study as 
panel data, the pooled OLS models may not be proper methods to estimate the effects of the 
independent variable on religious restrictions. This study uses fixed effect models to examine the 
“within” effect of the ratification of ICCPR in countries, taking account of both the heterogeneity 
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across countries and years. The estimates of this study should reveal whether states change 
behavior in religious freedom after they ratify the treaty within the time frame in this study. I will 
test the following models: 
Fixed Effect Models: 𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑔/𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑 = (𝑖+𝑡) + 𝛽1𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
In this model, 𝑖 is the individual effect and 𝑡 is the time effect. 𝑖 captures the effects 
that are specific to some countries but constant over time, whereas 𝑡 captures effects that are 
specific to some time period but constant over countries. Controlling for time effect is necessary. 
First, important international events such as the end of Cold War happened during 1990-2008. 
Also, there is an increasing trend in the past decades that human rights data are inflated due to the 
higher of accountability and better data collection methods (Fariss 2017). Taking account of fixed 
effect of years helps alleviate this problem.  𝑖𝑡 is the error term in this model.  𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of 
control variables including ratification of ICCPR, number of HROs, political regime, judiciary 
independence, population, GDP size, GDP growth rate, internal war and external war and the 
regime duration, and percentage of Christians and Muslims, religious diversity and official state 
religion.  
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Effect of Globalization on the Protection of Religious Rights for 
Organizations 
The results from the base model and the full model estimating the effects of globalization 
on the protection of religious freedom support my hypothesis 1.  In table 6.3, it is clear that political 
and social globalization are both positively related to the restrictions on religious freedom for 
organizations. When political and social globalization increases one unit, the restrictions on 
religious organization increase by 0.3% standard deviation. The effect sizes are same. When all 
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the control variables are included in the model, the model results from table 6.3 indicate that all 
dimensions of globalization and the overall globalization are all positively related to the 
restrictions of religious organizations. Political, social, and overall globalization have a bigger 
effect than economic globalization. This means that as countries become more globalized 
economically, politically and socially, the restrictions on the religious organizations also become 
more severe. Globalization establishes new ties and strengthens ties between countries through 
trade, political interactions, social communications, and etc. Inevitably, globalization have 
exposed the local religions to value systems from new religions, and religious nationalists push 
the government to make policies to restrict and control new minority religions, and therefore, the 
religious restrictions increase. Because groups are public and social, and pose a bigger threat to 
the local religions and the government, therefore, they are more likely to be restricted.  
In addition, globalization has been enabling religious groups to connect with transnational 
religious organizations with the advancement of technology and communication tools. Because 
governments are suspicious of the foreign connections religious groups have and afraid of the 
exposure of their human rights violations, and the following naming and shaming events. 
Therefore, governments might preempt and control religious groups tightly as the globalization 
trends deepen.  
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Table 6.3 : Model Results for Religious Organizations 
 Restrictions on Religious Organizations 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model  
7 
Model 
8 
Economic 
globalization 
0.002**    0.002*    
 (0.001)    (0.001)    
political globalization  0.004***    0.004***   
  (0.001)    (0.001)   
social globalization   0.004***    0.005***  
   (0.001)    (0.002)  
overall globalization    0.006***    0.009*** 
    (0.001)    (0.002) 
Ratification of ICCPR     -0.059** 0.011 0.029 0.011 
     (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
HROs     0.0004 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.002** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy 0.00002 -0.001 0.0002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
-
0.00000 
-0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
log(Population) 0.240*** 0.292*** 0.293*** 0.256*** 0.248*** 0.294*** 0.290*** 0.264*** 
 (0.056) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.056) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) 
log(GDP) 0.010 -0.031 -0.044 -0.048* 0.006 -0.028 -0.041 -0.037 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
GDP Growth -0.012** -0.009 -0.011* -0.010 -0.015** -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Internal War -0.030 -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 -0.033* -0.022 -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
External War -0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
New Regime -0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Judiciary 0.192 0.207 0.140 0.179 0.207 0.197 0.117 0.128 
 (0.159) (0.186) (0.188) (0.187) (0.160) (0.187) (0.191) (0.189) 
Christianity(%) 0.067 0.007 0.155 0.040 0.137 0.004 0.135 0.082 
 (0.307) (0.366) (0.367) (0.367) (0.311) (0.370) (0.372) (0.370) 
Islam(%) 0.016 0.017 0.003 0.013 0.024 0.016 -0.001 0.013 
                                                                                   112 
 
 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Religious Diversity 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.352*** 0.350*** 0.349*** 0.343*** 0.346*** 0.334*** 
 (0.079) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.079) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
N 1442 1486 1472 1472 1442 1486 1472 1472 
R-squared 0.059 0.062 0.055 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.056 0.066 
Adj. R-squared -0.030 -0.027 -0.035 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.036 -0.025 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
6.5.2 Effect of Globalization on the Protection of Religious Rights for Individuals 
The model results regarding the influence of globalization on the protection of religious 
individuals’ rights mostly support hypothesis 2. The model results are quite consistent in table 6.4. 
The effects of three dimensions of globalization and the overall globalization are all statistically 
insignificant, which supports hypothesis 2. Therefore, globalization does not have a consistent and 
robust effect on the protection of religious rights for individuals. The null findings might indicate 
that governments see individual level of practice of their religions as less threatening as the 
deepening of globalization, and impose less restrictions on individual believers.  
 
Table 6.4 : Model Results for Religious Individuals 
 Restrictions on Religious Individuals 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
economic 
globalization 
0.001    0.001    
 (0.001)    (0.001)    
political globalization  -0.001    -0.001   
  (0.001)    (0.001)   
social globalization   -0.0001    0.001  
   (0.001)    (0.002)  
overall globalization    -0.001    0.0003 
    (0.001)    (0.002) 
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Ratification of ICCPR     0.051 0.050 0.047 0.046 
     (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
HROs     -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracy -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
log(Population) -0.089 -0.075 -0.088 -0.081 -0.085 -0.078 -0.090 -0.085 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) 
log(GDP) -0.069** -0.058** -0.063** -0.060** -0.057* -0.052* -0.057* -0.053* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) 
GDP Growth -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.00001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Internal War 0.040* 0.038 0.040* 0.039 0.044* 0.040* 0.045* 0.043* 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
External War 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
New Regime 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Judiciary -0.086 -0.098 -0.089 -0.090 -0.122 -0.121 -0.139 -0.120 
 (0.206) (0.199) (0.201) (0.201) (0.206) (0.200) (0.204) (0.203) 
Christianity(%) 0.527 0.580 0.516 0.534 0.524 0.535 0.497 0.497 
 (0.396) (0.393) (0.392) (0.394) (0.402) (0.396) (0.397) (0.397) 
Islam(%) -0.014 -0.017 -0.014 -0.015 -0.020 -0.023 -0.021 -0.020 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Religious Diversity -0.033 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.047 -0.040 -0.046 -0.044 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) 
N 1442 1486 1472 1472 1442 1486 1472 1472 
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021 
Adj. R-squared -0.074 -0.073 -0.074 -0.074 -0.072 -0.072 -0.073 -0.073 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
 
6.6 Conclusions and Discussions  
Despite the burgeoning studies into connections between the level of states’ integration in 
the global system and their respect for human rights, the relationship between the globalization 
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and governments’ respect for religious freedom is less explored. This study examines the 
relationship between the aggregate level and three dimensions of globalization and states’ respect 
for religious freedom, which will contribute to the scholarship in both human rights and the 
religious freedom studies. This study expands the study of human rights into religious freedom, 
the spiritual integrity right. The key contribution this study makes to human rights studies is that 
it differentiates the two dimensions of human rights: individual and groups. Due to the dual 
nature of human rights, globalization can have different influences on the protection of group 
and individual dimensions of religious freedom.  
This study finds that overall globalization and its political, economic and social 
dimensions unfortunately have contributed to the rise of religious restrictions for groups. 
Globalization increases the frequency of contact and exchanges between people across borders 
and poses threats to the local religious values and identities people hold. This in turn leads 
people to fight back against globalization to preserve their religious and national identities. Also, 
the transnational networks of religious groups make these organizations are even more 
threatening to the government as globalization furthers. Therefore, the governments tighten their 
control of religious groups with the deepening of globalization. In contrast, religious individuals 
are less threatening to governments in the increasingly globalized world, because religious 
individuals practice their religions in private.   
This study has the following merits: First, this study expands the study of human rights 
into religious freedom, which is a less explored human rights in the scientific study of human 
rights. Second, this study not only examines the effects of all dimensions of globalization, but 
takes account of the dual dimensions of religious freedom. I use two datasets with a 
comprehensive measure for religious restrictions and a measure of states’ integration into the 
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international system. The KOF globalization Index not only includes three dimensions of 
globalization, but also the institutional characteristics and policies.  
This study also has policy implications. Facing the difficulties in religious freedom 
protection globally, this study might offer some insights on the new solutions to protect religious 
freedom. Despite the efforts to protect religious freedom since the Second World War by the 
United Nations, INGOs, and some western liberal states, many governments still restrict 
religions and persecute religious groups and individuals. Due to the lack of enforcement 
mechanism of international human rights instruments, states cannot easily be held accountable 
for their actions. Globalization seems to make states more suspicious of religious groups and 
tighten their control over groups. Therefore, policy makers, activists and international 
community should pay more attention to and come up with new solutions to better protect 
religious groups, and other group dimension of human rights.  
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7 Conclusion 
As globalization has deepened in the past a few decades, states have become more 
interdependent and international affairs also more interwoven, but the violations of international 
human rights are still widespread.  The international community has made great efforts to 
improve the protection of human rights since the end of the World War II. International norm of 
human rights is increasingly being internalized by states with more and more states ratifying 
human rights treaties. International human rights organizations are also making grass roots level 
efforts to mobilize dissenters, persuade powerholders, acculturate government officials, diffuse 
norms, and name and shame. This study explores whether states have improved their practice in 
religious freedom in this increasing globalized world, and whether the efforts made by the 
international community, including international law and human rights organizations, are 
effective in the protection of religious freedom.  
Spiritual integrity rights have been marginalized in the scientific literature on human 
rights. I believe that is a serious oversight, and it is what motivated this study. Indeed, religious 
freedom has historically played a central role in the human rights discourse. Knowing where, 
when, and why these rights are violated is thus important for understanding “human rights” writ 
large. However, it is also important because better protection of religious freedom leads to 
improvements in societal well-being more generally (Hertzke 2018).  
Religious freedom is conducive to democracy and the protection of other civil liberties. 
Even though democracy is a proven antidote to human rights violations, especially the freedom 
of religious institutions, religious freedom can in turn promote regime transition to democracy. 
Liberal democracy tolerates religious institutions operate freely, and religions tolerate states to 
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have authority in civil matters (Stepan 2000). Huntington also argues that the theological 
embrace of religious freedom by the Catholic church at Vatican II enabled the church to catalyze 
the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993). The free practice of Christian missionaries 
also played a big role in the spread of democracy (Woodberry 2012). Religious freedom is 
positively correlated with women’s empowerment (Grim and Finke 2010), and government and 
social restrictions are associated with gender inequality (Grim and Lyon 2015). Religious 
restrictions can also lead to genocide and mass atrocity. For example, the Muslim Rohingya 
minority groups were mass killed because of the intolerance of their religious identity. Groups 
and individuals belonging to Christian and Islam communities are being targeted in genocide in 
Central African Republic, because of their religious identities. Therefore, religious freedom can 
be a preventative measure for genocide. 
Religious freedom can also lead to economic development. Religious freedom of 
individuals and groups often leads to religious diversity in a society, which facilitates trade, 
entrepreneurship and growth of economic activities (Gill 2013). Freedom of religion also attracts 
creative, risk-taking and pioneering individuals and groups to develop businesses and increases 
the rate of economic growth (Gill and Owen 2017). On the other hand, government restrictions 
on religion produce social hostilities, which would undermine economic growth (Grim, Clark, 
and Snyder 2014).  
Religious freedom also leads to a better security for a society. Religious freedom can 
address the problems of terrorism, fanaticism, religious conflict and despotism (Farr 2008). 
Religion has great political influence, and the restrictions of religion often lead to wars and chaos 
(Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011), and persecution and violence (Grim and Finke 2010). Therefore, 
religious freedom is an important condition for peace and stability. Religious restrictions also lead 
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to religious terrorism and violence, because restrictive environment facilitate radical theologies 
(Saiya 2018). Religious liberty is a weapon of peace to combat terrorism. Repressions promote 
militant political theologies, which is a key threat to stability and peace. When various religious 
groups have freedom of religion and  join forces together,  their faith based activism work promotes 
international human rights and shapes American foreign policy (Hertzke 2006). 
Another contribution this study makes to the scientific literature on human rights is to 
theoretically and empirically differentiate between the individual and the group dimensions of 
rights provision. Built off the western liberal tradition, human rights are held to be universal for 
individuals (Donnelly 2013). Even though there are potential pitfalls of embracing group rights as 
human rights (Donnelly 2013), I argue that both individual and group dimensions of human rights 
need to be taken account for in the study of international human rights. Human rights are comprised 
of individual and group dimensions. The social and communitarian dimension of religious practice 
is integral to religious rights. Denying the practice of religion by groups can lead to the 
compromise of the individual practice of religion. For example, some religions mandate communal 
worship in groups settings such as churches.  Denying and restricting the legal existence or practice 
of churches and other religious groups also imposes restrictions on the individuals’ free practice 
of religion. Therefore, I take account for both individual and group dimensions of religious 
freedom in the empirical chapters to examine the effects of various factors on the protection of 
religious freedom. Empirically, the results of factor analysis of the RAS 2 dataset indicate that 
religious freedom indeed has two dimensions: individual and group.  
Individual and group rights are inherently different. Individual rights provision is less 
threatening to dominant societal factions and the state, but abusing these rights is also less visible; 
group rights provision is more threatening to dominant societal factions and the state, but abusing 
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these rights is also more visible. Because of the theoretical difference between religious groups and 
individuals, the international forces, such as globalization, international law and HROs, render 
different effects on the protection of religious group versus individual rights.  
Globalization as a general force is fueling nationalist backlash and challenging states’ 
authority, causing governments to impose new restrains on religious rights – particularly those at the 
group-level. Why religious groups are targeted more harshly under the backdrop of globalization? It 
is because religious groups are more threatening to the majority religion and state authorities. As the 
cross-national connections between the political, economic, and social actors grow, religious 
groups resort to institutionalized forms to strengthen their identities.  As the perceived threat of 
religious groups to governments grows, states tighten their control of religious groups as the 
globalization deepens. However, globalization does not significantly influence how states treat 
religious individuals, because individuals pose less of a threat to the status of a majority religion 
and the government’s rule of the country.  
At the same time, however, there are also international solutions to the challenge brought 
by globalization. The international community has made efforts to better protect religious and 
other human rights in both top-down and bottom-up processes. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is especially effective in the protection of religious rights for 
groups. States improve how they treat religious groups after their ratification of ICCPR; the 
longer they have ratified, the better they behave towards religious groups. Because religious 
groups are in the public, restrictions on the groups are overt and easily to be exposed. To avoid 
being criticized by the UN human rights council and other third-party actors, states tend to 
comply with their international legal commitments and change policies and practice towards 
groups. However, states compensate for the concessions they make and tighten their control of 
religious individuals. Restrictions and persecution of religious individuals are covert and private; 
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therefore, they are harder to be observed and exposed. The technical difficulties involved with 
the protection of individual rights are also exacerbated by the principal agent problem. Local 
government and police force could abuse their power and endanger the individual rights such as 
religious freedom.  
HROs are also able to address religious restrictions in a bottom up process. The domestic 
presence of HROs is effective in improving conditions for religious groups but not for 
individuals, because the domestic HROs can help the local religious groups to mobilize and 
pressure the governments to change their policy and also help ease the tension by mediating 
between the government and the groups and reducing the political repercussions from social 
movements. However, naming and shaming campaigns by transnational advocacy networks can 
reduce the level of religious restrictions on individuals but not on groups. Because the 
restrictions of religious individuals are private and covert, when the transnational advocacy 
networks transmit the information to the international audience and expose their rights 
violations, states are forced to change how they treat individuals due to the increased reputational 
costs. Because restrictions on groups are in the public, naming and shaming campaigns do not 
necessarily create new information. Thus, they do not influence the rights protection for religious 
groups.  
In addition, some common predictors of human rights conditions also have divergent 
effects on the two dimensions of religious rights. Due to the different nature of rights of religious 
individuals versus groups, some factors exert significant influence on the protection of religious 
groups but not on individuals. The restrictions on religious groups increase when the population 
and GDP growth rate grow. Because population growth increases the competition for natural 
resources, and GDP growth rate is in tandem with the unequal distribution of wealth, groups are 
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in the public and more visible and more threatening to the authority and majority groups in the 
country, therefore, they are more likely to be the target of the government restrictions.  Having a 
religious establishment is also related to a higher level of religious restrictions. Because of the 
marriage of the government with a religion, the perceived threat to the government and 
established religion by other religious groups is aggravated. Therefore, religious establishment 
especially increases the level of restrictions on religious groups but not for religious individuals. 
On the contrary, some other domestic factors have an effect on the protection of religious 
individuals’ rights, but not and effect on the protection of religious groups. For example, the size 
of GDP, the percentage of trade in GDP and democracy are positively related to a higher level of 
rights protection for individuals, but not for groups. With the bigger size of GDP, there is less 
competition for resources in the nation, therefore, repression is reduced for individuals. Also, 
with the deepening of integration into the international community, states are more likely to 
comply with international human rights protection norms and less concerned with political 
competition, therefore, the level of restrictions on individuals are reduced. After states become 
more democratic, they generally respect individual citizens’ civil liberties more. The cost of 
repression is also higher in more democratic societies where citizens can hold leaders 
accountable for and sanction repressive behavior; cost of repression is lower in authoritarian 
regimes. However, groups continue to pose a bigger threat to the authority and majority factions, 
therefore, these factors are not able to exert significant influence on groups.  
A better understanding of religious freedom has great implications for the theoretical and 
policy development in human rights. To better protect religious freedom, we need to have a 
fuller understanding of what measures are effective and what are not. Because of the different 
dimensions of religious freedom, almost all factors proven to be related to the conditions of 
                                                                                   122 
 
 
human rights work on the two dimensions differently. Due to the divergent effects of these 
factors, the international community needs to be more aware of these differences, strengthening 
the positive effects and diminishing the negative effects.  Therefore, the international community 
can strengthen the effect of the positive factors and improve the effects of factors which are 
underperforming.   
Due to the different natures of religious rights for groups versus individuals, it is clear 
that groups seem to hold a bigger leverage against the governments. Governments perceive a 
bigger threat from and are more suspicious of groups, but they are also under the more pressure 
to change their policy under the pressure of the political disruptions caused by social movements 
led by groups. Because of the advantages of religious groups hold, they can use their leverage to 
better help the relatively weaker religious individuals to bargain with the governments. However, 
there are also specific measures to improve religious freedom for groups and individuals 
respectively based on the empirical findings in this study.  
Some domestic and international measures are proven to be effective in protection of 
religious rights for individuals, so the international community should work to strengthen their 
effects. First, democratization and economic development should be promoted. As the states 
become more democratic, they restrict religious practice of individuals less. Due to enhanced 
political competition and increased costs for repression, states are generally less likely to engage 
in repressive behaviors. As the economy develops, the competition for resources is decreased, 
therefore, states engage in less repressive behavior also. Second, some international solutions are 
proven to be effective in the protection of religious individuals. Strengthening the trade relations 
with other countries are helpful in the protection of individual rights. As states are more 
connected with international market with trade relations, they are also less likely to limit 
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religious freedom for individuals. Naming and shaming campaigns by transnational advocacy 
networks are also effective in bringing external pressure to force states to improve rights 
practice. Maintaining peace and stability is also crucial for the better protection of religious 
rights for individuals, because wars with other states increase the level of restrictions on religious 
individuals.  
There are also some solutions to the restrictions on religious groups. Two domestic 
measures are especially effective in reducing religious restrictions for groups. First, a well-
protected civil society is able to provide support to religious groups; therefore, it is useful in the 
better protection of religious groups. Second, a political system which differentiates religion 
from government also provides better protection for the religious rights of groups. 
Internationally, the norm in human rights protection should continue to be promoted and induce 
more states to join human rights treaties. An international legal commitment is useful in a better 
protection of group religious rights due to higher reputational costs from the visibility of 
violation of the group rights. 
The dual nature of religious freedom provides new insights how the global community 
can better protect religious freedom, but also not only points a promising new direction in the 
study of human rights. This study makes contribution in the advancement of theoretical 
development in human rights by providing empirically grounded theoretical arguments that the 
two dimensions of human rights are different and the factors used to explain variations in human 
rights influence the two dimensions differently. The effects of international factors, including 
globalization, international law, and HROs, are different on these two dimensions. The effects of 
other domestic factors such as GDP, population and wars also have different effects on the 
protection of the two dimensions of human rights. 
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Broadly speaking, this study also provides evidence that supports the liberal and 
constructivism international relations traditions. Even though realists argue that power and self-
interest are key factors that constraining states’ behavior, liberals believe in the important roles 
that international institutions such as international law and NGOs play in international relations. 
Keohane (1984) argues that most of the international agreements are self-enforcing, and 
reputation can explain states’ conformance to international law ( Keohane 1984). This study 
finds that states tend to modify their behavior regarding the protection of religious rights for 
groups due to the higher reputational costs to them in comparison to religious individuals under 
the pressure of international legal commitment. This study also supports the constructivism 
theory that NGOs play a positive role in promoting the norm of human rights (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). The norm of human rights matters, because the “norm entrepreneurs” in HROs are able to 
alter state behaviors in the protection of individual religious rights through naming and shaming 
campaigns. In addition, this study also provides support to the importance of ideas and identities 
in international politics. Globalization has posed threats to particularized religious beliefs and 
identities, therefore, there has been backlash against globalization through the tightening 
restrictions on religious groups.  
However, we also need to be cautious to make any conclusive arguments on the 
applicability of the main paradigms in international relations theory. This study is limited in the 
temporal scope, because it covers the quantitative analysis from the years 1990 to 2003. The 
recent developments in international relations over the last ten years might challenge the some of 
conclusions I have drawn in this study. For example, there has been an anti-democracy trend in 
the world along with populism and nationalist movements, and democracies such as the U.S. 
have taken isolationist stances in international relations and are withdrawing from institutions 
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such as the UN human rights council. These developments might weaken the effect of 
international institutions and norms in human rights protection. In addition, some authoritarian 
regimes have adopted more advanced monitoring tools to watch citizens’ behaviors. Therefore, 
the theoretical foundation that individual restrictions are harder to be observed than group 
restrictions might need to be revised if this trend is widespread among countries. All in all, it is 
not clear that these trends in the past ten years have altered the patterns I discovered in this cross 
national study, but it is necessary to collect data after 2003 and conduct further analysis to 
examine the protection of religious groups rights versus individual rights. This points at a new 
direction for future studies in religious freedom by taking account of the above trends with a 
longer span of time.  
The future study of international human rights should also take account of the dual nature 
of individual and group dimensions when examining the causes and effects of human rights 
violations. An overlook of the two dimensions can hinder the theoretical development of 
international human rights study. The two dimensions of human rights is not a unique concept in 
religious freedom but can be applied in other kinds of human rights, such as labors’ rights, 
women’s rights, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly. A complete understanding of 
human rights can be gained when the two dimensions of rights are considered together. Studies 
can be conducted on how various domestic and international factors influence to what extent 
governments respect other kinds of rights for groups and individuals, which will strengthen the 
external validity of the findings in this study. After all, individuals’ rights are less threatening, 
but violations are less visible, but group rights are more threatening, but violation are more 
visible. Governments’ interactions with groups and individuals can be different, due to the 
altered motivations based on the dual nature of human rights. It would be a promising direction 
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to examine whether the results for the effects of international factors on religious freedom hold 
true for other kinds of human rights. 
In addition, more study can be done on how the two dimensions of human rights 
influence factors such as democracy, economic development and protection of other human 
rights. It is challenging to establish the causal relationships between the protection of human 
rights and these factors. Due to the overlook of existing studies on the dual nature of human 
rights, taking account of the dual nature of human rights might be helpful in exploring the causal 
effects of human rights. Do the two dimensions of rights influence the level of democratization 
and economic development in a country differently? Liberation of group rights seems to be a 
bigger compromise the states make to the civil society and might be in turn more inducive to a 
higher level of democratization.  Freedom of groups may also give individuals the freedom to 
participate in various group activities and promote the economic development in a society.  
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